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RECENT CASES
Conflict of Laws-Significant Interest Doctrine
Extended to Marital Property Litigation
Crichton, a native of Louisiana who had lived in New York most
of his life, died in 1962. The bulk of his fortune was made in Louisiana. Decedent was survived by his second wife, from whom he had
been separated since 1935, and four children, two of whom were
issue of an earlier marriage. Decedents will made no provision for his
second wife, and all of his estate passed in trust with the income to
be distributed among his four surviving children. The bulk of the
estate consisted of intangible personal property in the form of bank
accounts and stocks and bonds held in custody accounts in Louisiana.'
In June, 1965, the executrix initiated an ancillary proceeding in Louisiana for approval of her inventory and computation of Louisiana inheritance taxes. Decedent's widow asserted a claim to community
property rights in the intangible personal property there inventoried.2
The two children of decedents first marriage objected on the ground
that the Louisiana court did not have jurisdiction to determine ownership of the property. Rejecting the children's contention, the Louisiana
court issued an order "permanently" restraining the executrix from
disposing of or removing the property from Louisiana. The executrix
had also filed an intermediate account in the New York Surrogate
Court in September, 1965, setting forth as allowed but unpaid the
widow's share of the alleged community property. One child of the
first marriage subsequently filed an objection to allowance of the
community property claim on the ground that Louisiana's community
property laws were inapplicable to govern marital property fights of
New York domiciliaries. In granting the daughter's motion for partial
summary judgment, the Surrogate decided that Louisiana's community property laws were inapplicable and the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the judgment. On appeal by the executrix to the
1. The decedent owned gas and oil producing lands in Louisiana which were managed by his brother. Acting for the decedent, the brother invested the income derived
from these lands in stocks and bonds and maintained the bank accounts.
2. The widow based her claim primarily on LA. Cv. CODE ANN. art. 2400 (West,
1952) (hereinafter cited as art. 2400). That statute provides: "All property acquired
in this State by nonresident married persons, whether the title thereto be in the name
of either the husband or wife, or in their joint names, shall be subject to the same
provisions of law which regulate the community of acquets and gains between citizens
of this State."
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Court of Appeals of New York, held, affirmed. In a marital property
dispute involving intangible personal property, the choice of law
problem should be resolved by determining which jurisdiction has the

most significant interest in the application of its law. Estate of
Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967).
Traditionally, in the choice of law situation involving marital property rights where both husband and wife are domiciled in one state
and one of the marital partners acquires movable (or intangible)
property in another state, the law governing the marital property
interest of the other spouse in that property has been held to be

the law of the domicile of husband and wife at the time the property

was acquired.3 It should be noted that intangible and tangible per-

sonality are both treated as "movables" for the purposes of making
a choice of law. A minority of jurisdictions have sometimes applied,
often inconsistently, an alternative rule providing that the applicable
law in such disputes is the law of the situs of the movable at the
3. H. MAsSH, MARITAL PROPFRTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 192-97 (1952). Marsh
points out that there may be some variation in the application of this rule depending
on the method by which the property was acquired. He lists these variations as
follows: (1) Marital property interests in movables acquired by a marital partner
through the process of gift, devise, or descent in a non-domiciliary jurisdiction are
governed by the law of the marital domicile at the time of acquisition; (2) marital
property rights in movables acquired by one spouse in a non-domiciliary state in return
for services will generally be determined by the law of the marital domicile at the
time of acquisition; (3) where the movable acquired in a non-domiciliary state is
a chose in action (specifically a cause of action in tort) the authorities are divided
between the rule of lex loci delicti (the law of the place of injury) and that of the
law of the marital domicile; (4) where movables are acquired by purchase in a nondomiciliary state, the usual rule is that the law of the marital domicile governs. See
Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Hume, 121 Ala. 168, 25 So. 806 (1899), (involving
rights in intangible property). The court held that "as between the husband and the
wife, their rights in personal property coming to the wife attach under, and are
governed by, the law of the place where they are domiciled at the time the property is
received." Id. at 170, 25 So. at 807. It must be noted that none of Marsh's four
categories exactly fits the situation in the instant case. In Crichton, the movables
(stocks, bonds and bank accounts) are acquired by the non-domiciliaries through the
process of converting income from the real property (or immovable) holdings in
Louisiana into intangibles. However, the law of the domicile at the time of acquisition
(New York) would probably still have applied. See MARSH, supra at 110. See also
Castleman v. Jeffries, 60 Ala. 380 (1877) (immovable belonging to the wife in a
non-domiciliary state was sold and movables received in payment were treated as a
new acquisition with consequence that the marital property interests were determined
by the marital domicile at the time of the sale-note the similarity between this factual
situation and that of the instant cases). Also, the rule of "partial immutability" established by Mr. Justice Story in Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 569 (La. 1827),
would probably support the application of the traditional domicile rule to the instant
case. Story's rule was that any property acquired during coverture, absent an agreement
to the contrary, was subject to the law of the marital domicile at the time of acquisition. For a brief discussion of the origin and effect of this rule see A. ErnFNzwEi,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 245, at 648-53 (1962).
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time of acquisition. 4 It has been said that Louisiana is the only state
in which statutory law has played a significant part in the process of
choice of law where property has been acquired in a non-domiciliary
state by husband and wife. Exactly what effect that statutory law has
had with regard to movable (or intangible) property, however, has
been an unsettled issue to the present day.5 Until quite recently, the
great majority of courts have applied the rule of lex loci deliciti (the
law of the place of injury) in resolving the conflict of laws problems in
tort actions. 6 Widespread dissatisfaction with this inflexible rule led to
the development of the theory that choice of law problems in torts
should be resolved by applying the law of the state having the most
significant interest in the particular legal dispute. 7 The case of
Babcock v. Jackson8 represents the embodiment of this significant
interest theory in tort law, and is the case most often cited to provide
4. The classic argument invoked in support of the situs rule is that it affords greater
protection to purchasers and attaching creditors. However, the situs of a tangible
chattel tends to be the marital domicile. Therefore, where a chattel has been taken
from its situs at the time of acquisition and removed to the marital domicile, the
attaching creditor is likely to experience obvious difficulty under the situs rule. With
regard to intangible property, such property has only a fictional situs, and it is not
possible to apply realistically a situs rule based on physical location of such property.
See MAasH, supra note 3, at 100.
5. See Neuner, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws, 5 LA. L. REv. 167, 170
(1943). The only cases have involved choses in action in tort arising in Louisiana in
favor of non-domicilaries. In Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc., 202 La. Ann. 505, 12 So.
2d 253 (1942), and Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851 (1900),
the courts held that art. 2400 did not apply to such a chose in action and that the
law of marital domicile at the time of acquisition governed property rights in the
chose. However, a federal court in Louisiana reached a different conclusion. Meyerson
v. Alter, 11 F. 688, 689 (C.C.E.D. La. 1882) held that art. 2400 did apply to
choses in action and that the object of the legislature was "to subject non-residents
who acquire rights within this state to the same rules as those which govern the
resident citizens." One writer in the area has said in reference to art. 2400 that it
"provides that the community property system shall apply to ... all Louisiana property
(with no distinction between movables and immovables) acquired by non-residents."
See Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 Tut. L. BEv. 3, 12 (1959).
6. See Otey v. Midland Valley R.Co., 108 Kan. 755, 197 P. 203 (1921); Poplar v.
Bourjois, Inc., 298 N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948); H. GoonnacH, CoNFric-r OF LAws
260 (3d ed. 1949).
7. See Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HAnv. L. REv. 881 (1951); Weintraub,
A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CoRNxELLr, L.Q. 215 (1963) (both
articles suggest the application of the "significant interest" approach). The desire to be
rid of the rule of lex loci delicti was fostered by its roots in the discredited vestedrights theory of conflict of laws. For an excellent discussion of the vested-rights theory
and its shortcomings see Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role
and Utility, 58 HAtv. L. REv. 361 (1945). The unhorsing of lex loci delicti was also
given impetus by a "significant relationship" approach urged by the Restatement
authors. See RESTATE~MENT (SEcoN) OF CoN1_cr OF LAws § 379 (1) (Tent. Draft
No. 8, 1963); id. (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
8. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (the law to be applied
in resolving each substantive issue in a tort action is the law of the jurisdiction having
the most significant interest in the issue of law presented.)
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the rationale for choice of law decisions in that area today.9 A similar

development has also taken place in the law of contracts in recent
years. The leading case of Auten v. Auten'0 sets forth a significant

interest approach to the solution of choice of law problems in the
field of contracts in the form of "the center of gravity" rule. These

advances" in choice of law resolution in tort and contract have
touched the realm of family and marital relationships, particularly
in the areas of intrafamily tort immunity and family support. 12 The
decision in the instant case, however, represents the first major
attempt to apply the significant interest doctrine to a conflicts problem arising out of a marital property dispute.
9. Prior to the complete rejection of the rule of lex loci delicti in Babcock, New
York had made a tentative move away from the rule in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). In Kilberg, the court
used a rather transparent procedural-protective argument based on strong policy
arguments and incidental contacts with the place of the accident to allow a New
York resident to recover greater damages for wrongful death than would have been
the case had the law of the place of the tort been applied. Advancing from Kilberg,
Babcock presented a methodology which later courts could apply in solving conflicts
problems. To determine which state had the greatest concern with the specific issue
raised in litigation a court should: (1) isolate the issue; (2) group the contacts and
relationships of the parties with the states involved; and finally (3) evaluate those
contacts and relationships in the light of the policies of the states which underlie their
rules of law. The Babcock methodology has been greeted with high hopes throughout
the legal profession. See, e.g., Cheatham, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1229 (1963); 77 HAzv. L. REv. 355 (1963); 17 VAND. L. RMv. 283 (1963);
49 VA. L. REv. 1362 (1963). The Babcock method of conflict resolution has been
applied in numerous cases. See, e.g., Dym v. Gordin, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d
792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1965) (questionable result). See also Macey, v. Rozbickli, 18
N.Y.2d 289, 292, 221 N.E.2d 380, 381, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593 (1966) (Keating, J.,
concurring); Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d
796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965).
10. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); accord, W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223
Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945); Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475,
170 A.2d 22 (1961).
11. Not all authorities are agreed that the "center of gravity," "grouping of contacts,"
or "significant interest" test, as it is interchangeably called, represents an advance.
It has been termed a test based on mere catchwords inadequate to describe a principle
of law. See Judge Van Voorhis' dissent in Babcock and Judge Desmond's dissent in
Dym v. Gordin, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1965). Prof,
Cheatham, however, has defended the characterizing phrases as being "at least as
adequate to define a principle of law as the terms 'due process of law' . . . 'reasonableness'. . . . Cheatham, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLum. L. REv. 1229,
1230-31 (1963).
12. See McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966), where law of
marital domicile was applied rather than lex loci delicti in order to prevent wife
from recovering from husband for wrongful death of daughter. Citing Babcock, the
court held that "[wihat should be sought is an analysis of the extent to which one
state rather than another has demonstrated by reason of its policies and their connection
.and relevance to the matter in dispute, a priority of interest in the application of its
rule of law." Id. at 94, 215 A.2d at 682 (emphasis added); accord, Thompson v.
Thompson, 193 A.2d 439 (N.H. 1963). In Downs v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
14 N.Y.2d 266, 251 N.Y.S.2d 19, 200 N.E.2d 204 (1964), Judge Fuld, who wrote the
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Proceeding on the premise that Louisiana had no reasonable
interest in regulating marital property rights of the decedent and his
widow-who were domiciled in New York, had not been married in
Louisiana, and had never resided there during coverture-the instant
court concluded that it was "reasonable to assume" that article 2400
was enacted solely for the purpose of effectuating the legitimate
governmental interest of Louisiana in regulating the marital property
rights of persons domiciled in that state. 13 Conceding that the
presence of intangible property in Louisiana gave that state power
to adjudicate rights in the property according to its own laws, 4 the
instant court reasoned that if it allowed such adjudication in this case,
it would in reality be acquiescing to "an attempt of Louisiana to
regulate the marital relationship of New York domiciliaries." Dismissing traditional choice of law rules used to determine the rights
of husband and wife in marital property, 15 the court decided that
opinion in Babcock, held that an assignment of wages illegal under Massachusetts law
would be upheld where made by a worker in Massachusetts whose marital domicile
was New York and where the wages were assigned for the purpose of supporting his
wife and child in New York. He said that New York had the most significant relationship and contacts with the dispute and thus a paramount interest in settling it
under New York law.
13. As indications of the context in which art. 2400 was enacted, the court cited
two cases decided prior to enactment of the statute holding that the real property
of non-residents located in Louisiana was not subject to the community property laws
of that state, but rather to the laws of the state where the owners were domiciled at
the time the property was acquired. Wolfe v. Gilmer, 7 La. Ann. 583 (1852);
Huff v. Borland, 6 La. Ann. 436 (1851). MnsH, supra note 3, at 198, suggests that
art. 2400 might have been passed in reaction to the result of these cases. As support
for its premise that Louisiana has no interest in regulating marital-property rights of
non-domiciliaries, the instant court cited Hyman, Lichtenstein & Co. v. Schlenker &
Hirsch, 44 La. Ann. 108, 10 So. 623 (1892). The instant court conceded that from
the unequivocal wording of the article, it would appear that the Louisiana courts would
apply their own law to determine the widow's rights in the disputed intangible
property; however the court felt that two Louisiana decisions rendered subsequent
to the enactment of art. 2400 lent weight to the conclusion that the article was not
meant to apply to the property of non-domiciliaries. In Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., 52
La. Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851 (1900), the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that a
married woman's cause of action for a tort occurring in Louisiana was an intangible
property right which had its legal situs at the matrimonial domicile of the woman and
could not be said to have been property acquired in Louisiana so that Louisiana law
would necessarily apply. In Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc., 202 La. 505, 12 So. 2d
253 (1942), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that art. 2400 was not inapplicable in
such a situation but that it would not be applied where the domiciliary law of the
non-residents was not inimical to the policy of Louisiana. The instant court reasoned
that certainly the law and policy of New York afforded a widow adequate protection
and thus could not be inimical to the policy of Louisiana. For a different interpretation
of the Matney case see MAsu, supra note 3, at 201.
14. See Stumberg, Marital Property and Conflict of Laws, 11 TEXAS L. lv.
53, 62

(1932) for a general discussion of this power.
15. The instant court cites the traditional choice of law rule in this type of dispute

as "one which looks to the law of the marital domicile to determine the rights of the
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the choice of law problem in this case "should be resolved by an
examination of the contacts which Louisiana and New York have
with this controversy for the purpose of determining which of those
jurisdictions has the paramount interest in the application of its law."' 6
Though cognizant of the 17 fact that this case did involve several
"contacts" with Louisiana, the court found that New York had a
greater interest in applying its marital property laws to govern persons
married and domiciled within its borders, and that New York had
"not only the dominant interest in the application of its law and
policy, but the only interest." 8
The immediate effect of the instant decision is to extend the
significant interest doctrine, as a choice of law rule, into the area
of marital property disputes. In so doing, the instant court has
expressly rejected traditional conflicts rules previously applied in this
field.' 9 Though this extension is limited by the facts of this case to
disputes involving movable or intangible property, it would seem
husband and wife in property acquired during coverture," (Emphasis added). Citing
with approval two previous New York cases which had refused to apply that rule, the
court stated that the rule was rejected because it failed "to take cognizance of the
policies of jurisdictions other than those which have what is regarded as the sole
controlling contact and the interests which those other jurisdictions have in the application of their laws," 20 N.Y.2d at 133, 228 N.E.2d at 805, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
See Wyatt v. Fulrath. 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1955), and
Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933), cited by the instant court as
authority for this point. In both of these cases, a New York court applied the law of
a jurisdiction other than that of the marital domicile, and as it turned out, applied
the law of the jurisdiction which happened to be the situs of disputed intangible
property (New York law). The appellant-executrix in the instant case urged that
these cases represented the rule that New York would now apply the law of the situs
of intangible property. The instant court answered this contention by stating that the
major rationale in those two cases had not been grounded on any situs doctrine, but
rather that "[in both these cases we were giving effect to New York's policy and
governmental interest." 20 N.Y.2d at 137, 228 N.E.2d at 808, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
(Emphasis added).
16. 20 N.Y.2d at 133, 228 N.E.2d at 805, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 819. The instant court
used as principle authority Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 209
N.E.2d 792 (1965) and applied those principles which guided it in Babcock v. Jackson,
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.2d 743 (1963). See note 9 supra.
17. The appellant-executrix urged that the significant contacts which should give
Louisiana the paramount interest in the case were: (1) decedent was born in Louisiana;
(2) although domiciled in New York, the majority of his wealth had been gained in
Louisiana; and (3) the situs of his intangible property, i.e., the documentary evidence
of that property, was located in Louisiana.
18. 20 N.Y.2d at 134, 228 N.E.2d at 806, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 820 [Emphasis added].
In support of this conclusion the instant court relied on McSwain v. McSwain, 240 Pa.
86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966). See note 12 supra.
19. See notes 3 & 4 supra, and accompanying text. It is evident that the Crichton
court could have decided the dispute before it by simply giving effect to LA. CiV. CODe
ANN. art 2400, or by relying on the rule that the law of the marital domicile at the time
of acquisition applied, which would have given the same result as that reached in the
instant case, or by resorting to the rarely used situs rule.
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that, logically, the significant interest rule could be applied by a court
with the same result to immovable (real) property, although in such

a case, the state in which the real property had its situs could set
forth a forceful "sovereignty" argument in favor of applying its own
law.20 However, the policy argument that the state of the marital
domicile has the most significant interest in applying its law to govern
property rights arising out of the marriage relationship sanctioned by
that state, is persuasive and it is possible that it would prevail.2'
Marital property rights are inextricably tied to the marriage relationship and that relationship has its existence in the state of marital
domicile. It would seem logical, therefore, to look to the law of the

state where the relationship exists for the determination of the

property incidents of that relationship. 22 Applying the methodology of
Babcock, as it was applied by the instant court, it is likely that most
courts will find that the state of marital domicile would have the

most significant interest in the application of its law.23 It is submitted

that the instant court has intelligently applied the rule of Babcock

and, in so doing, has extended that already pervasive rule to yet
20. Doubtless, Louisiana could assert that it has, as a sovereign state, a very close
connection with regulating title to the real property within its borders and as a consequence of that connection, it has the paramount interest in applying its own law to
all such property regardless of the law of the marital domicile. See MARsH, supra
note 3, at 199. It has been stated that the choice of law rule with regard to real
property is that the law of the situs of that property governs. There is ample ground
for questioning this rule, however. See note 22 infra.
21. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966), where in a case involving
a conflict between federal law and state marital property law, the Supreme Court
held that the law of family-property rights is peculiarly local in nature and the
domiciliary state has a great interest in regulating its families and the property rights
arising from the family relationship. From a different perspective, the rule that the
situs of realty should give the state of that situs the paramount interest in applying
its law to govern rights to the land is weakened by its rather archaic justification. Such
notions have a largely historical basis in the "feudal identification of land ownership
with political powers and the consequent insistence that the land law be wholly
autarkic." MARSH, supra note 3, at 101. Numerous cases have held that the law of
the situs of real property does not determine the law to be applied in determining
marital rights in that property. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Gilmer, 7 La. Ann. 583 (1852);
Huff v. Borland, 6 La. Ann. 436 (1851) (cited by the instant court in support of its
decision regarding the relative strength of the case for applying Louisiana policy compared with that for applying its own).
22. See Stumberg, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws, 11 TinAs L. REV.
53 (1932): "Marital property and the marital relationship are so closely bound together that unless some particular reason founded on local policy dictates otherwise
they should be subject to the same law." Id. at 65-66.
23. See notes 3 & 9 supra. Indeed, it appears that, in marital property litigation,
the law of the marital domicile will be applied with more frequency under the traditional "law of the marital domicile rule." It should also be noted that the "time of
acquisition," which was an essential element of the traditional rule loses its significance
under the paramount interest rule-the state of marital domicile probably has the
dominant interest in applying its law regardless of when the property was acquired.
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another problem area of conflict of laws. By applying the significant

interest doctrine, the Crichton decision has set a new standard of
objectivity which will hopefully be followed in the area of marital
property litigation.

Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Fourth
Amendment Restrictions Apply to Electronic
Eavesdropping When Conversations Are PrivatePhysical Trespass Test Discarded
Defendant Katz was indicted for violating a statute prohibiting the
interstate transmission of bets or wagers by wire communication.'
At the trial, the government introduced recordings of defendant's
telephone conversations, obtained by FBI agents who had attached

an electronic device to the outside of the public telephone booth from
which defendant placed his calls. 2 The defendant was convicted in

the district court, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
use of the electronic eavesdropping equipment on the ground that
there had been no physical intrusion into the telephone booth. 3 On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Although the eavesdropping equipment did not penetrate the wall of the
telephone booth, the government's unauthorized eavesdropping vio-

lated the defendant's privacy upon which he had justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted an illegal search

and seizure under the fourth amendment. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1084, which provides in pertinent part: "(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication
facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest,
or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive
money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing
of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both."
2. The defendant had been seen placing calls from a bank of three public phone
booths during certain hours and on an almost daily basis. From February 19, 1965 to
February 25, 1965, at predetermined hours, the FBI placed microphones on the tops
of two of the phone booths normally used by defendant. (The third phone was placed
out of order). The microphones were attached to the outside of the telephone booths
with tape, and there were no physical penetrations inside of the booths. The microphones were activated only when the defendant was approaching and actually in the
booth. Wires led from the microphones to a wire recorder on top of one of the booths.
Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir. 1966).
3. Id. at 133, 134.
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Electronic eavesdropping was first considered by the Supreme Court
in Olmstead v. New York,4 a 1928 wiretapping case in which the
Court held that electronic eavesdropping was not per se violative
of the fourth amendment. 5 The Court said that verbal utterances
were not tangible objects which could be unconstitutionally seized
and that the fourth amendment was not violated unless there had
been an official search and seizure of defendant's person, or a seizure
of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical
invasion of his house for the purpose of making a seizure. 6 The Court
concluded that the eavesdropping did not violate the fourth amendment because no physical intrusion had taken place.7 In response to
the Olmstead case, Congress enacted section 605 of the 1934 Federal
Communications Act,8 which prohibited the interception or divulgence
of communications of others. The Supreme Court, however, restricted
the scope of section 605 and held that it prohibited wiretapping only.9
The Court also continued to apply the rationale of the Olmstead case
so that it was clearly established that the fourth amendment prohibited eavesdropping only when it was accomplished by a physical
trespass. 10 Nevertheless, in 1961 the Supreme Court began to intimate
that the adequacy of the trespass test was being reconsidered. In
Silver7man v. United States," the Court stated that the fourth amendment should not turn upon the technicality of a trespass as a matter
of local law, but that the application of the amendment should be
based on the reality of an unauthorized physical intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area.' 2 The Court also suggested that it
4. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), noted in 38 YALE L.J. 77 (1928).
5. The Court also said that the electronic eavesdropping did not violate the defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination since there was no evidence
of compulsion. Id. at 462.
6. Id. at 464-66. Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone and Butler dissented. Mr. Justice
Holmes contended that the evidence should have been excluded on the grounds that
the wiretapping had violated state law. Id. at 469-71. Mr. Justice Brandeis (Stone,
J., concurring) felt that the fourth amendment, liberally construed, conferred the
"right to be let alone," and that "[t]o protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion
by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 478.
7. Id. at 466.
8. 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (1962), which provides in pertinent part: "[No person not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person .... "
9. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 131 (1954); Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129, 133 (1942).
10. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129 (1942); United States v. Farina, 218 F.2d 62, 63 (2d Cir. 1954).
11. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
12. Id. at 512. However, the Court never outlined the requisites of a constitutionally
protected area. See King, Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional Rights; Some
Recent Developments and Observations, 33 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 240, 255 (1964);
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would have reconsidered the trespass test if that test had not prohibited the eavesdropping, 13 but since the electronic eavesdropping

which occurred was prohibited under the trespass test, the Court
declined to reconsider its adequacy. 14 In Wong Sun v. United States,15
the Supreme Court extended fourth amendment protections to verbal
statements. 6 Since the trespass test originally had been necessitated
because of the Court's refusal to include verbal statements within
the scope of fourth amendment protections, 17 the Wong Sun holding
eliminated the main reason for the continued use of the trespass

test. 8 Finally, in Berger v. New York,

9

the Court held unconstitu-

tional a New York statute which regulated eavesdropping and wiretapping.20 The Court clearly determined that electronic eavesdropping was a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment 2 l

and held that the statute was unconstitutional because it lacked provisions for adequate judicial supervision and permitted general
searches by electronic devices.22 Justice Douglas, in a concurring
Note, Electronic Surveillance and the Right of Privacy, 27 MONT. L. REV. 173, 183
(1966). The Court has said that an accused's house, business office, or store are
constitutionally protected areas. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962). See
also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). But without clearly distinguishing these above areas, the Court said that a jail cell was not a constitutionally protected area. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962). See also Smayda v. United
States, 352 F.2d 251, 256-57 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966).
13. 365 U.S. 508-09. See The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HAuv. L. REv. 40, 184
(1961). In fact, since the inception of the trespass test in Olmstead, there always bad
been some members of the Court who had advocated its abandonment. Mr. Justice
Brandeis felt that eavesdropping should be treated as an invasion of privacy and
subject to the prohibitions of the fourth amendment. Olmstead v. New York, 277
U.S. 438, 471, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion). Justices Frankfurter and Stone
subsequently agreed with Mr. Justice Brandeis, Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129, 136 (1942) (dissenting opinion), as did Mr. Justice Douglas, Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (concurring opinion); On Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747, 765 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
14. 365 U.S. at 509.
15. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
16. Id. at 485. The statement was made after petitioner was confronted with evidence unlawfully obtained, and was thus "no less the 'fruit' of official illegality than
the more common tangible fruits of unwarranted intrusion." Id. at 485-86. See also
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966).
17. Olmstead v. New York, 277 U.S. 438, 463, 465 (1928).
18. See Note, Electronic Surveillance and the Right of Privacy, 27 MONT. L. REv.
173, 183 (1966). However, the Court did continue to refer to the trespass test as if
it were good law. E.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966); Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963). But, after the Silverman case, the Court
did not use the trespass test to uphold the electronic eavesdropping.
19. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
20. N.Y. CODE. Cmm. PRoc. § 813-a.
21. 388 U.S. at 51.
22. Id. at 59-60.
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opinion, indicated that the Berger case overruled sub silentio Olinstead v. United States23 and its offspring. 24

In the instant case, the Supreme Court first considered the circumstances under which electronic eavesdropping would be within the
purview of the fourth amendment. The Court noted that the fourth
amendment protects persons, not places, and that its protection
extends to the recording of oral statements; therefore, the Court
felt its prohibitions should not turn on the absence or presence of a
physical intrusion. The Court concluded that the "trespass" doctrine
of Olmstead could no longer be regarded as controlling. Instead the
Court applied a privacy standard and said that a person may be
protected by the fourth amendment from unreasonable searches and
seizures in any area he seeks to preserve as private, even an area
accessible to the public.2 5 Consequently, since the fourth amendment
extends to the recording of oral statements and since the Court felt
that defendant had justifiably relied upon the telephone booth for
privacy, the Court concluded that the electronic eavesdropping had
violated defendant's right of privacy and constituted a search and
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.2 Having made
this determination, the Court next considered whether the eavesdropping was a "reasonable" search and seizure. In this regard, the
Court emphasized that, with narrow exceptions 2 7 searches conducted
without prior approval by a judicial officer are per se unreasonable
under the fourth amendment. Noting that the surveillance here had
been so narrowly circumscribed that a judicial officer could have
approved it,23 the Court concluded that the search and seizure was
23. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
24. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring). But see
Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on Eavesdropping and Wire-tapping, 16 CLEv.MAR. L. REv. 467, 475 (1967). See also Note, Electronic Surveillance and the Right of
Privacy, 27 MONT. L. BEv. 173, 183-84 (1966).
25. 389 U.S. at 351-52. The Court also said that what a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of fourth amendment
protection. Id.
26. "No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a
taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment." Id. (footnotes omitted).
27. The Court listed several cases as examples of instances in which prior judicial
approval was not required. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (search of
suspect's house minutes after an armed robbery had occurred and suspect had entered
the house); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (search of car which had been
impounded as evidence); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (search of
a car on the open road for contraband where suspect's actions established probable
cause for belief that a crime was being committed); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle could
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought).
28. "[I]t is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly
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per se unreasonable because it was conducted without such approval.2"

The Court's action in discarding the trespass test has substantial
merit for three reasons. First, the trespass test had turned on whether
there was a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,
but there was considerable confusion as to what constituted a constitutionally protected area. 30 Second, the application of the trespass

test oftentimes resulted in logically irreconciliable decisions. For
example, in Goldman v. United States3 ' the government agents placed
a detectaphone against the wall of a room adjoining the office of
defendant. The eavesdropping was held not violative of the fourth
amendment. 32 On the other hand, in Clinton v. Virginia 3 the police
inserted a very small device into the wall of an adjoining apartment,

and the Court held the eavesdropping did violate the fourth amendauthorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for such investigation, specifically
informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly apprised of the precise
intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the Government asserts in fact took
place." 389 U.S. at 354.
29. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, felt that the application of the
fourth amendment was dependent upon the fulfillment of two requirements: "first, that
a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectancy of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 389
U.S. at 360 (concurring opinion). Applying this test to the instant case, Harlan
concluded that the defendant's telephone conversations were protected by the fourth
amendment. Justices White, Douglas and Brennan also concurred, but disagreed as
to when electronic eavesdropping was excepted from the fourth amendment requirements. Mr. Justice White said that the Court should not require the warrant procedure
nor the magistrates judgment if the President or Attorney General "has considered
the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable." Id. at 364. On the other hand, Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice
Brennan concurred, felt that there should be no distinction between types of crimes
and that national security should not be excepted from fourth amendment requirements.
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Black said that the language of the fourth amendment shows that the amendment was to be limited to the protection of tangible things.
He said that the Olmstead and Goldman cases had not been eroded by subsequent
decisions and that prior to the instant case they were still good law. He conceded
that the Bill of Rights should be liberally interpreted, but he refused to "give a meaning to words which they have never before been thought to have and which they
certainly do not have in common ordinary usage." Id. at 373. Therefore, he concluded
that the fourth amendment did not apply to electronic eavesdropping.
30. Cases and materials cited note 12 supra. Note, Electronic Surveillance and the
right of Privacy, 27 MoNT. L. RBv. 173, 183 (1966). The Supreme Court had said that
the accused's house, business office, or even a store were constitutionally protected
areas. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962). See also Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). However, without clearly distinguishing the preceding
cases, the Court said that a jail cell was not a constitutionally protected area. Lanza
v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962). See also Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d
251, 256-57 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966).
31. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
32. Id. at 135.
33. 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (per curiam).
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ment.34 Although the practical effects of the eavesdropping in both
cases were identical, the legal conclusions were totally different.
Finally, the Court was justified in discarding the trespass test because
of the inadequate protection it had provided. Since modem technology has provided the police with devices which can detect and
record conversations occurring within the most private confines without necessitating a physical intrusion, the trespass test permitted
eavesdropping without any meaningful limitations.35 In place of the
trespass test, the Court has inserted a privacy test: verbal utterances
which a person seeks to preserve as private will be protected by the
fourth amendment from unreasonable electronic eavesdropping.1 It
would appear that this new standard is considerably more pervasive
than the trespass test and that it will bring within the purview of
the fourth amendment all verbal statements intended to be private.
This means that for evidentiary purposes electronic eavesdropping
cannot be used unless "a duly authorized magistrate, properly notified
of the need for such investigation, specifically informed of the basis
on which it was to proceed, and clearly apprised of the precise
intrusion it would entail,"37 has authorized a very limited surveillance.
These restrictions eliminate, at least for evidentiary purposes, eavesdropping on a broad scope, or for a long duration, or before probable
cause has been established. On the other hand, the restrictions
imposed on eavesdropping for evidentiary purposes may not affect
its use when the government does not use the eavesdropping itself as
evidence. For example, the police may be able to use eavesdropping
as a method of discovering other incriminating evidence which may
then be seized by lawful means. Since neither the accused nor the
trial judge will know that the police have been eavesdropping in
violation of the fourth amendment, the prosecution will have no
difficulty using the evidence38 Furthermore, the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, which excludes evidence obtained directly or
indirectly as a result of an illegal search and seizure,9 is practically
ineffective when the trial judge and the accused are not aware that
an illegal search and seizure has taken place. Therefore, the courts will
34. Id. See also Note, The Constitutionality of Electronic Eavesdropping, 18 S.C.L.

11v. 835, 836 (1966).
35. See Olmstead v. New York, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (dissenting opinion); King,
Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional Rights: Some Recent Developments and
Observations, 33 GEo. WAsHr. L. REv. 240, 262 (1964); Note, Electronic Surveillance
and the Right of Privacy, 27 MoNT. L. Rtkv. 173, 185 (1966); Note, The Constitutionality of Electronic Eavesdropping, 18 S.C.L. REv. 835, 841 (1966).
36. 389 U.S. at 351-52. See also id. at 360 (concurring opinion).
37. Id. at 354.
38. In many instances, the prosecution also may not be aware that the evidence
was obtained as the fruits of illegal eavesdropping.
39. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 21

find that they are unable to prohibit effectively some of the constitutional abuses attending illegal eavesdropping unless the police attempt
to use the eavesdropping itself as evidence. This practical inability
of the courts to restrict eavesdropping means that the legislatures may
have to intervene with civil and criminal sanctions as well as other
means of more effectively controlling the use of eavesdropping.

Constitutional Law-Section

5(a) (1) (D)

Prohibiting

Members of Communist-Action Organizations from
Employment in Defense Facilities Held Unconstitutional Infringement Upon Freedom of Association
The defendant, a member of the Communist party and employee
of a shipyard, was charged with violation of section 5(a) (1) (D)l of
the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which prohibits a
member of a Communist-action organization 2 from working in a
"defense facility."3 The indictment charged the defendant with
unlawfully and willfully continuing his employment with knowledge
of the final registration order against the Communist Party and with
notice of the shipyard's designation as a defense facility. In granting
defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, the district court held
that section 5(a) (1) (D) required allegations of "active membership"
in the Communist Party and "specific intent" to further its unlawful
goals. 4 On direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. Section 5(a)(1)(D) of the Subversive Activities Control
Act of 1950 unconstitutionally infringes upon the first amendment in
establishing guilt by association without requiring proof that the
individual is in a "sensitive position" within the defense facility and
that he is an active member in agreement with the unlawful aims of
the Communist Party. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
1. 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (1964).
2. Section 3(3)(a) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 782(3)(a) (1964), defines "Communistaction organization" as: "any organization in the United States (other than a diplomatic representative or mission of a foreign government accredited as such by the
Department of State) which (i)is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by
the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement . . . and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world
Communist movement......
3. Under § 5(b) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 784(5) (b) (1964), when the Secretary of
Defense determines that the security of the United States so requires, he may designate
a facility as a "defense facility," thus making section 5(a)(1)(D) applicable.
4. The decision of the District Court for the Western District of Washington is
unreported.
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Freedom of association was first delineated in N.A.A.C.P. v. Ala5 in which the Supreme
bama ex rel. Patterson,
Court, treating freedom
of association as derivative from and ancillary to first amendment
rights, elevated it to an independent status. 6 The Court considered
that the interest of the state in compulsory disclosure of the Association's membership list was insufficient to justify possible adverse
effects upon the rights of members of the Association. The Court,
as in subsequent freedom of association cases, 7 applied a balancing
test, weighing the interest that the government seeks to protect and
the means by which it is protected against the degree of infringement
upon the right of association under the first amendment., Thus in
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,9 the Court,
finding the interest of the government in national defense sufficient
to allow significant infringement upon freedom of association, upheld
an order of the Board requiring the Communist Party to register as a
Communist-action organization and to disclose its officers and mem5. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Supreme Court, reversing judgment of contempt
against the N.A.A.C.P. for failure to produce its membership list in accordance with
an order of the Alabama state court, found that such disclosure might affect the
ability of the N.A.A.C.P. and its members to pursue their beliefs and might induce
some members to withdraw from the Association due to the consequences of exposure.
6. For a discussion of the development of freedom of association, see generally
Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964);
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
7. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963)
(investigative committee ordered local N.A.A.C.P. president to disclose Association's
membership in order to determine whether certain alleged Communists were members
of the Association); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (Virginia statute
prohibited the N.A.A.C.P. from urging Negroes to seek redress through the Association's
legal staff for violation of civil rights); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
(Arkansas statute required teachers, at risk of loss of employment, to list all organizations in which they were members or which they had contributed in the last five
years). But see Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1,
137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 259 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting). For general discussion and criticism of balancing test and
Justice Black's theory of absolute first amendment rights, see Douglas, The Right of
Association, 63 CoLum. L. 1EBv. 1361 (1963); Emerson, supra note 6; Franz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Griswold, Absolute is in the
Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions,
8 UTAHS L. REv. 167 (1963); Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against
PoliticalFreedom, 49 CAMw. L. REv. 4 (1961).
8. In a series of cases involving freedom of speech and press, the Court adopted
the "clear and present danger" test, developed by Justice Holmes in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). This test, which has not been applied in freedom
of association cases, allowed significant infringement upon freedom of speech or the
press when the circumstances are such that the words, if not repressed, "will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 249 U.S. at 52.
See Antieu, Dennis v. United States-Precedent, Principle or Perversionp, 5 VAND. L.
Rv. 141 (1952); Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-FromSchenck to Dennis, 52
CoLum. L. lEv. 313,(1952)..
9. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). -"
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bership. However, in Scales v. United States,10 the Court recognized
that Congress' derivative power under national security was limited
and that membership in an organization which may have both legal
and illegal aims may not be prohibited without proof that the
individual adheres to and promotes the illegal as well as the legal
aims.'i Thus, the Court in Scales held that the Smith Act,12 which
imposes criminal penalties upon members of an organization advocating violent overthrow of the government, requires active membership
with knowledge of the illegal aims of the organization and the specific
intent of the member to overthrow the government. The Court has
also refused to sustain an infringement upon constitutionally protected liberties where the purpose of Congress can be achieved by
13
more narrowly drawn legislation. In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,'
the Court declared unconstitutional, under the fifth amendment,
section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 14 which denied the
right to travel abroad to members of a Communist-action organization
which was under a final registration order. The majority condemned
the statute on the ground that it applied indiscriminately to all members regardless of an individual's knowledge or belief that he was
associated with a Communist-action organization, or that its aims may
be illegal, and regardless of whether the area in which an individual
wishes to travel is "sensitive" security-wise. 15
In the instant case, the majority held that section 5(a)(1)(D)
was unconstitutional due to overbreadth. The statute was found to
impose guilt by association in that it "sweeps indiscriminately across
all types of associations with Communist-action groups, without
regard to the quality and degree of membership."' 6 The Court determined that section 5(a) (1) (D), in effect, forced the individual to
either terminate his association with the designated organization or
give up his job. Citing Aptheker,17 the Court held that the specific
constitutional infringement was due to the failure of Congress in
10. 367 U.S. 203 (1961) noted in 15 V.MD. L. REv. 279 (1961).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

367 U.S. at 229-30.
18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
378 U.S. 500 (1964).
50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964).
378 U.S. at 510-12.
389 U.S. at 262 (1967).

The Court rejected the district court's decision that

the statute could be saved from constitutional infirmity by reading into the section the
requirement of active membership and specific intent. Although this was done under
the Smith Act in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), the Court found that
the clarity and preciseness of section 5(a) (1) (D) prevented such an interpretation in
this case.
17. The government had argued that Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964) was not controlling, because the right to travel under the fifth amendment was
a more basic freedom than the right to work in a defense facility. The Court rejected
this argument by holding that under § 5(a)(1)(D), the basis of loss of employment
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section 5(a) (1) (D) to distinguish between active and passive membership in a Communist-action organization. The Court found that
the statute did not require the individual to be aware of or to agree
with the organization's aims and, further, that the statute did not
consider whether the individual was in a "sensitive" position within
the defense facility. "Sensitive position" was defined as a position in
which the individual "could bring about any discernible adverse
effects on the Nation's security." 8 While recognizing the legitimacy
of Congress' interest in national defense and security, 19 the Court
determined that Congress must adopt more narrowly drawn legisla-

tion so as to avoid a conflict with first amendment freedoms.20 Mr.

Justice White, dissenting, contended that the right of association, as
a judicial construct, was not an absolute right and was subject to
regulation by the State in certain instances. In the area of national
security, for example, the dissent would prefer the judgment of
Congress, based on a thorough investigation, to that of the Court,
particularly since the extent of infringement upon protected rights
was here limited to exclusion from employment in only certain designated defense facilities. This specific and minimal loss of employcontended, was outweighed
ment or associational rights, the dissent
21
by the threat to the national security.
The instant decision is consistent with the tests applied by the
Supreme Court in Scales and Aptheker. By imposing the requirements of active membership, knowledge of and agreement with the
unlawful aims of the organization, and sensitivity of position, the
Court has attempted to insure that a member of a Communist-action
organization is not penalized for association which may be based
upon purely philosophical agreement with Communism and therefore
limited only to furtherance of the legal aims of the Communist
organization. The result is that Congressional legislation must distinguish between activities which may, but do not necessarily, pose
a threat to national security, and those activities in which the
was the exercise by the individual of his constitutional right of association under the
first amendment.
18. 389 U.S. at 266 n.17, at 25 (1967).
19. The government had contended that the statute was justified under Congress'
war power. In dismissing this contention, the majority said that implicit in the term
"national defense" is the concept of protecting the democratic ideals found in the
Constitution, the "most cherished" of which are expressed in the first amendment.
20. The majority of the instant court noted that it did not balance the first amendment rights against the governmental interests involved. See note 19 supra. The
Court's analysis was confined to whether or not the means adopted by Congress was
constitutional.
21. Mr. Justice Brennan in a concurring opinion held that the statute was not
unconstitutional for overbreadth, but that it constituted an unauthorized delegation of
power to the Secretary of Defense to designate certain facilities as "defense facilities."
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individuas commitment and strategic position pose a clear and
immediate threat. In order to preserve the individual's personal freedom of expression and association, it is essential that this distinction
be maintained. Nevertheless, while the result achieved by the majority decision may be correct, the reasoning employed by the Court is
open to question. The Court seems to balance the respective interests
only to the extent that it normally does so in most cases involving
close constitutional issues. However, contrary to previous cases
involving freedom of association, 2 the Court expressly declined to
apply the traditional "balancing test" employed under the first amendment.P Rather than weigh the interests of the government against
the degree of infringement upon freedom of association, the Court
found that "the Constitution requires that the conflict between
congressional power and individual rights be accommodated by legislation drawn more narrowly to avoid the conflict. 24 By utilizing
this method, the Court failed to examine properly the basis upon
which the instant legislation was promulgated. The national security
interest of Congress evidenced by this legislation, based generally
upon self-preservation and specifically upon the desire to protect
against espionage and sabotage in defense facilities, are given insufficient consideration in the majority opinion. Although the end
of national security in a broad sense may not justify the resulting
indiscriminate application under this statute, one can be highly critical
of a decision which fails to delineate the exact nature and purpose
of the particular governmental end evidenced here. Having propounded a set of vague tests, the Court failed to afford any specific
indication as to what type of corrective legislation it might uphold.2
Unfortunately, the thrust of this decision is essentially negative, leaving definitional guidelines to future litigation under new legislation
by Congress.
22. See note 7 supra.
23. "It has been suggested that this case should be decided by "balancing" the
governmental interests . . . against the First Amendment rights asserted by the
appellee. This we decline to do. We recognize that both interests are substantial, but
we deem it inappropriate for this Court to label one as being more important or more
substantial than the other." 389 U.S. at 268 n.20 (1967).
24. Id. (Emphasis added).
25. The Court in the instant decision expressly declined to consider either the
constitutionality of an industrial security screening program or the constitutionality of
other alternatives which might possibly be available to Congress. 389 U.S. at 267
(1967). In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court, faced with a security screening
program set up by the executive branch, held that the executive branch had exceeded
its authority under the Congressional legislation. For an indication of the first amendment implications involved in such a program, see Schnieder v. Smith, 389 U.S. 810
(1968) (Fortas, J., concurring).
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Criminal Law-Evidence-Unauthorized Juror View
Violates Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation
Defendants DeLucia and Montella were convicted of attempted
burglary and possession of burglar's tools. The defendants filed a
motion for a new trial, alleging that certain jurors admitted having
viewed the premises where the defendants allegedly committed the
crime. The defendants contended that the jurors' view and re-enactment' at the scene of the alleged crime violated their right to due
process of law under the fourteenth amendment. 2 The conviction was
upheld by the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division and on
re-argument 3 to the court of appeals, held, reversed. Where jurors,
prior to return of a verdict, have an unauthorized view of premises
where a crime has allegedly been committed by the defendant, they
will be permitted to impeach their verdict to insure that the defendant's sixth amendment guarantee4 of right to confrontation is
safeguarded. People v. DeLucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 229 N.E.2d 211, 282
N.Y.S.2d 526 (1967).
The general rule that a juror may not impeach his own verdict has
been firmly entrenched in American 5 and English6 jurisdictions for
many years. The doctrine first gained prominence following Lord
Mansfield's decision in Vaise v. Delaval.7 Since that time the vast
majority of American courts8 have consistently accepted and applied
the rule. The doctrine originally was justified by Lord Mansfield on
1. Since this was the basis of the defendant's appeal to the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, United States ex rel. DeLucia v. McMann, 373 F.2d 759 (2d Cir.
1967), it is assumed to be the defendants contention in the present decision.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. The case was first argued before the court of appeals in People v. DeLucia, 15
N.Y.2d 294, 205 N.E.2d 324, 258 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1965), in which the conviction of
the defendants was upheld. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in DeLucia v. New
York, 382 U.S. 821 (1965). The defendants petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, and while
the appeal for dismissal of the writ was pending the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in United States ex rel. DeLucia v. McMann, 373 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1967),
dismissed the writ without prejudice and vacated the order of the district court in
order to allow the New York courts to reconsider the case in light of the Supreme
Court decision in Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... "
5. State v. Gabriel, 342 Mo. 519, 116 S.W.2d 75 (1938); State v. Cacavas, 55
Idaho 538, 44 P.2d 1110 (1935); Smith v. State, 59 Ark. 132, 26 S.W. 712 (1894);
see 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2354 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). But see C. McCorcur, EVIDENCE § 68 (1954): "Other courts would abandon the rule of disqualification, and would permit jurors to testify to misconduct and irregularities which
are ground for new trial."
6. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EvrmDEcE § 2354 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
7. 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
8. See note 5 supra.
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the grounds that a juror should not be permitted to allege his own
turpitude, 9 thereby indicating a policy against self-stultification.
Various other justifications have since been offered: (1) That a
privilege exists against disclosure of deliberations; 10 (2) that the
doctrine prevents jury tampering;1 (3) that it avoids protracted
litigation;' 2 (4) that it protects free discussion among jurors; 13 and
(5) that the parol evidence rule excludes such evidence.' 4 In an
effort to avoid injustice 5 which might result from inflexible application of the rule, many courts have applied restrictions delimiting its
use.16 These modifications have not ordinarily been justified on constitutional grounds, but have been imposed on grounds of seeking to
avoid patent injustice through denial of a fair trial. 17 Thus jurors
have been permitted to impeach verdicts arrived at by lot or chance, 18
verdicts based on communication, during retirement, of a juror's
personal knowledge,2 and verdicts where jurors gave false answers
to questions asked during voir dire examination.2 0 Some courts apply
the so-called "Iowa" 2 ' rule and allow jurors' affidavits to avoid a
d 2 in the verdict
verdict by proving any matter which does not "inhere"
9. Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
10. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933); see 8 J. WIGMORE, EvmNc. §
2346 (MeNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
11. People v. Van Camp, 356 Mich. 593, 97 N.W.2d 726 (1959); People v. Pizzino,
313 Mich. 97, 20 N.W.2d 824 (1945).
12. State v. Gardner, 230 Ore. 569, 371 P.2d 558 (1962); Hudson v. State, 17 Tenn.
408 (1836).
13. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); Sandoval v. State, 151 Tex. Crim.
430, 209 S.W.2d 188 (1948).
14. Murdock v. Sumner, 39 Mass. 156 (1839); see 8 J. WcmortE, EVDNc. §
2348 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
15. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); Smith v. Cheetham, 3 Cai. R.
56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); see State v. Gardner, 230 Ore. 569, 371 P.2d 558 (1962),
which indicates that departures from the rule are only to be permitted where "it is
'manifest that enforcement of the rule would violate the plainest principles of justice.'"
Id. at 574, 371 P.2d at 560.
16. See cases cited notes 18-24 infra; State v. Gardner, 230 Ore. 569, 371 P.2d 558
(1962).
17. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); State v. Gardner, 230 Ore. 569, 371
P.2d 558 (1962).
18. People v. Zelver, 135 Cal. App. 2d 226, 287 P.2d 183 (1955).
19. State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955); State v. Joseph, 230 Ore.
585, 371 P.2d 689 (1962).
20. The reason for this exception is grounded in the belief that since the affidavit
establishes that the juror was never qualified to serve, then in effect there is no verdict
to impeach. See People v. Lessard, 25 Cal. Rptr. 78, 375 P.2d 46 (1962); State v.
Serpas, 188 La. 1074, 179 So. 1 (1938).
21. Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
22. Marks v. State Rd. Dept., 69 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1954). Under this rule the effect
of extraneous or overt circumstances in influencing a juror's vote is excluded, but where
the juror's testimony concerns the mere existence or occurrence of events, it is permitted.
State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955).
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itself, consequently excluding the mental process of the jury members
during deliberations. Other courts distinguish between events occurring outside?3 the jury room and those occurring within.24 In the
recent case of Parkerv. Gladden' the Supreme Court relied on constitutional grounds in reversing a conviction where the conduct of
third persons had prejudicially influenced the jurors. A court bailiff,
assigned to a sequestered jury, had made statements to the jury which
were prejudicial to the defendant. Although the jurors' statements
had been admitted into evidence, the Supreme Court of Oregon failed
to find denial of a fair trial. In reversing, the Supreme Court determined that the defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation
had clearly been violated.
Insofar as an unauthorized view is concerned, the majority of
courts, including those of New York,2 1 apply the rule that the view,
while always improper, does not alone8 require the granting of a
new trial unless it is shown that rights of a defendant are substantially
prejudiced2 thereby.
In the instant case the majority relied on Parker v. Gladder30 in
support of their determination that the jurors, by their re-enactment
23. See Hempton v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N.W. 596 (1901); Pierce v. Brennan,
83 Minn. 422, 86 N.W. 417 (1901).
24. The New York courts followed the early rule of Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep.
944 (K.B. 1785), and refused to allow jurors' affidavits to impeach their own verdict,
Dalrymple v. Williams, 63 N.Y. 361 (1875); either within or without the courtroom,
People v. Sprague, 217 N.Y. 373, 111 N.E. 1077 (1916). The New York decisions
also have modified the broad scope of the rule by permitting jurors' affidavits to
establish a mistake in the reading or recording of the verdict, Darymple v. Williams,
63 N.Y. 361 (1875), and by distinguishing between juror misconduct and the conduct
of third persons in dealing with the jury. Schrader v. Joseph H. Gertner, Jr., Inc.,
282 App. Div. 1064, 126 N.Y.S.2d 521 (2d Dept. 1953). Jurors' affidavits are also
permitted to establish false answers during voir dire. McHugh v. Jones, 258 App.
Div. 111, 16 N.Y.S.2d 332 (2d Dept. 1939); People v. Leonti, 262 N.Y. 256, 186 N.E.
693 (1933). Since the jurors' testimony is excluded, hearsay affidavits of third persons
concerning what jurors may have stated are likewise inadmissible. People v. Sprague,
217 N.Y. 373, 111 N.E. 1077 (1916).
25. 385 U.S. 363 (1966). See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966),
wherein massive and adverse publicity prevented a defendant from receiving a fair

trial.
26. Ng Sing v. United States, 8 F.2d" 919 (9th Cir. 1925); Phillips v. State, 157
Neb. 419, 59 N.W.2d 598 (1953).
27. See cases cited note 29 infra.
28. See N.Y. CODE CaUM. PROC. § 465(2) -(McKinney 1958), which provides: "The

Court in which a trial has been had upon an issue of fact has power to grant a new
trial, when a verdict has been rendered against the defendant by which his substantial
rights have been prejudiced . . . [wlhen the jury has received any evidence out of
court, other than that resulting from a view .
29. In Phillips v. State, 157 Neb. 419, 424, 59 N.W.2d 598, 601 (1953), it was
held that an unauthorized view "will not vitiate the verdict where it'is not shown to
have affected the result of the verdict." People v. Kraus, 147 Misc. 906, 265 N.Y.S.
294 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1933); People v. Thorn, 156 N.Y. 286, 50 N.E. 947 (1898).
30. 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
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at the scene of the alleged crime, became "unsworn witnesses" 31
against the defendant, thereby denying his right of confrontation as
guaranteed by the sixth amendment. The court recognized that it
was faced with the conflict of weighing the policy reasons behind
forbidding jurors to impeach their verdict with the possible injustice
to the defendant which would result in applying the general rule.
The majority reasoned that since the alleged prejudicial conduct of
the jurors occurred outside the jury room, the policy reasons for
holding jurors' statements inadmissible are less compelling, since the
purpose of the doctrine is to prevent instability of verdicts resulting
from post-trial harassment of jurors concerning matters during deliberations. Consequently the court found that statements concerning
outside influence on a jury which deprive a defendant of the constitutional safeguard of the right to confront witnesses against him should
be admissible in evidence. However, the majority specifically noted
that in cases involving statements made during jury room deliberations the policy justifying the general rule ordinarily outweighs
possible injustice to a defendant, since the entire jury system itself
is threatened.3
The present case appears particularly significant when viewed in
terms of prior authority. The court, based on common law authority,
had earlier held the jurors' statements inadmissible in its first decision.33 However, in light of Parkerv. Gladden, the majority concluded
that a contrary result was required. This indicates that constitutional
requirements may demand a higher standard than did the prior exceptions to the general rule. Since past decisions have not specifically
relied on the Constitution in developing restrictions to the general
rule, the determination by the present court that the sixth amendment
compelled the result indicates a new approach to an old problem.
Additionally, the case is contrary to past authority insofar as the effect
of an unauthorized view is concerned, since the instant court found
the view alone to adversely affect the defendant's constitutional
rights without requiring an inquiry into its prejudicial effect upon
jury deliberations. Since the present decision was based upon a
newly enunciated constitutional right,3 it is likely that future litigation will be forthcoming to test the validity of the standards created
31. People v. DeLucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 279, 229 N.E.2d 211, 214, 282 N.Y.S.2d
526,530 (1967).
32. Id. Judge Van Voorhis, in his dissenting opinion, concluded that Parker v.
Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966), was distinguishable in that it involved statements by
a third party to the jury, consequently it did not compel a reversal. He also felt that
the rule forbidding a juror's impeachment of his own verdict was supported by sound
public policy and outweighed any prejudice to the defendant.
33. People v. DeLucia, 15 N.Y.2d 294, 206 N.E.2d 324, 258 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1965).
34. See United States ex rel. DeLucia v. McMann, 373 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1967).
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by prior authority. The court's reliance upon the sixth amendment
right to confrontation in reaching its decision might be subject to
serious criticism, since it is difficult to conceive how a defendant
might reasonably be afforded an opportunity to "confront" an unauthorized view of the scene of an alleged crime. Even if this determination is not accepted by other courts it is possible that the same result
could be reached through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment,3 since once it is determined that the prejudicial effect
of the outside influence outweighs the policy reasons justifying the
general rule, then it is easily arguable that a defendant has been
denied "fundamental fairness."

Domestic Relations-Intentional False Representation
of Pregnancy Grounds for Annulment
Defendant, having engaged in sexual intercourse with plaintiff at
frequent intervals for a year, told him, with no reasonable cause to
believe it true,' that she was pregnant, and threatened him with
expulsion from college and punitive civil and criminal action if he
did not marry her. Plaintiff married defendant and upon finding
that these representations were fabrications, plaintiff sought an annulment on the ground that the marriage was obtained by fraud.2
The trial court denied relief and on appeal to the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky, held, reversed. An intentional false representation of
pregnancy upon which the husband was induced to marry constitutes
fraud sufficient to grant an annulment. Parks v. Parks, 418 S.W.2d
726 (Ky. 1967).
It is generally recognized that a marriage induced by fraud is
voidable and subject to annulment.3 Such fraud as will justify annulment must be perpetrated at or before the marriage, must be intended to induce consent,4 and it must be shown that, absent the
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
1. The dissenting judge interpreted the facts to read that defendant had an actual
belief that she was pregnant, confirmed by a doctor. 418 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Ky. 1967).
2. Ky. REv. STAT. § 402.030. "Courts having general equity jurisdiction may declare
void any marriage obtained by . . . fraud .... "
3. See J. MADDEN, HANDBoox: OF THE LAw OF PERSONS AN DomaSTic tLATIONS
13-22 (1931); 3 W. NELSON, DivoRcE AND ANmmmET §§ 31.29-41 (2d ed. 1945).
4. Allen v. Allen, 126 W. Va. 415, 28 S.E.2d 829 (1944). There is authority to
the effect that where there has been no consummation of the marriage, fraud sufficient
to set aside an ordinary contract is sufficient to grant an annulment. Nocenti v. Ruberti,
17 N.J. Misc. 21, 3 A.2d 128 (Ch. 1933). It is probably better to state that where
the marriage has not been consummated the requirements of fraud are less strict.
Craun v. Craun, 300 F.2d 737 (1962) (Maryland law).
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fraud, the defrauded party would not have consented to the marriage.5
Because of the social importance attached to the institution of marriage all courts require something more than that measure of fraud
required to render a simple contract voidable.6 This idea is usually
expressed by the courts' requirement that the fraud go to the
"essentials" 7 of the marriage relationship. However, there is wide
disagreement among the courts as to what factors constitute the
essentials of a marriage. Generally, misrepresentation as to matters
incidental to the marriage relationship, such as age, rank, family,
fortune, health, character, morality, habits, reputation and premarital
falsehoods as to love and affection are not sufficient grounds for
annulment. 8 However, in aggravated cases of misrepresentation or
concealment of the above factors courts have held that the essentials
of the conjugal relationship are affected. 9 Concealed intent not to
perform marital duties'0 or not to engage in normal relations' is
generally considered to be so significantly involved with the marital
relationship that annulment will be granted. When the husband has
not had premarital intercourse with his wife, concealment of her
pregnancy by another is grounds for annulment, 2 whereas the courts
are split when there has been premarital intercourse between the
parties. 13 Further, when the wife misrepresented to her husband that
she was pregnant by him, when in fact she was not pregnant at all,
the majority of courts have denied annulment. These courts denying
relief have usually reasoned that since the parties were in par!
delicto, her action in inducing him to marry her could be regarded
5. Damaskinos v. Damaskinos, 325 Mass. 217, 89 N.E.2d 766 (1949); Shonfeld v.
Shonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477, 184 N.E. 60 (1933).
6. Mayer v. Mayer, 207 Cal. 685, 279 P. 783 (1929).
7. Craun v. Craun, 300 F.2d 737 (1962) (Maryland law); Handley v. Handley,
179 Cal. App. 2d 742, 3 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1960) ("very essence"); Allen v. Allen, 126
W. Va. 415, 28 S.E.2d 829 (1944) ("very fundamentals"); Masters v. Masters, 13
Wis. 2d 332, 108 N.W.2d 674 (1961) ("essential to").
8. Marshall v. Marshall, 212 Cal. 736, 300 P. 816 (1931) (false representation of
wealth); Bielby v. Bielby, 333 III. 478, 165 N.E. 231 (1929) (simulation of affection
to gain property interest); Fontin v. Fontin, 106 N.H. 208, 208 A.2d 447 (1965)
(concealment of previous marriage terminated by divorce); Avery v. Avery, 236
N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (premarital falsehood as to love and affection and to
defendant's wealth).
9. Craun v. Craun, 300 F.2d 737 (1962) (concealment of illicit living conditions);
Vachata v. Vachata, 58 111. App. 2d 78, 207 N.E.2d 129 (1965) (concealment of
pending indictment for forgery). Where one has venereal or other disease which is
dangerous to either spouse or offspring there exists an affirmative duty to reveal such
condition. Smith v. Smith, 171 Mass. 404, 50 N.E. 933 (1898) (syphilis).
10. Bernstein v. Bernstein, 25 Conn. Supp. 239, 201 A.2d 660 (Super. Ct. 1964).
11. Santos v. Santos, 80 R.I. 5, 90 A.2d 771 (1952) (wife wanted to engage only
in unnatural intercourse).
12. Hardesty v. Hardesty, 193 Cal. 330, 223 P. 951 (1924).
13. Westfall v. Westfall, 100 Ore. 224, 197 P. 271 (1921) (refusing); Winner v.
Winner, 171 Wis. 413, 177 N.W. 680 (1920) (granting annulment).
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as merely inducing him to perform his social obligation. 14 In
DiLorenzo v. DiLorenzo,15 an early New York case allowing annulment in a situation analogous to the instant case, the wife had represented to her husband that a young baby was his, when actually she
had borrowed the child from a friend; he thereupon married her. The
court, making no reference to the obvious fact that plaintiff must
have engaged in premarital intercourse with defendant, held that the
fraud was as to a fact, except for the truth of which the necessary
consent of the plaintiff would not have been given, and that it therefore afforded a sufficient ground for annulment. The court emphasized
the inducement of plaintiff to marry defendant, without requiring
that the fraud go to the essentials of the marriage. The New York
16
rule became perceptively less liberal with Shonfeld V. Shonfeld,
in which the court reiterated the DiLorenzo test but emphasized the
objective criteria of the "ordinarily prudent man." In a recent interpretation of the DiLorenzo-Shonfeld rule a New York court, in Kober
v. Kober 7 again rejected the "essentials of the marriage relation"
test and emphasized the lack of "consent" on the part of plaintiff.
The court in both DiLorenzo and Kober used an objective test, approaching marriage as a civil contract in which inquiry is directed
toward defendant's inducement and plaintiff's reliance rather than
toward the "essentials of the marriage relationship." Two courts
have allowed annulment in the factual situation presented by the
instant case.1 8 In the most recent of the two, Masters v. Masters, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court quoted favorably from the DiLorenzo case,
rejecting the "essentials of the marriage" test and the pan delicto
defense. The court emphasized the necessity to determine that the
marriage would not have been entered had such false representations
not been made. 19
In the instant case, the court refused to recognize as a legal defense
the alleged social obligation of a single man to marry a single woman
with whom he has had sexual intercourse. The court reasoned that
since this social obligation nowhere provides grounds for affirmative
14. Mobley v. Mobley, 245 Ala. 90, 16 So. 2d 5 (1943); Brandt v. Brandt, 123
Fla. 680, 167 So. 524 (1936).
15. 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63 (1903).
16. 260 N.Y. 477, 184 N.E. 60 (1933) (annulment allowed where defendant misrepresented that she had $6,000 to lend plaintiff to set up a business).
17. 16 N.Y.2d 191, 211 N.E.2d 817, 264 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1965) (annulment allowed
where husband concealed his background as a Nazi officer and his intense antisemitism).
18. Garfinkel v. Garfinkel, 9 App. Div. 2d 98, 191 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1959); Masters v.
Masters, 13 Wis. 2d 332, 108 N.W.2d 674 (1961).
19. Id. The court adds that there may be situations where policy reasons should
preclude the annulment of a fraudulently-induced marriage, such as false representations
as to financial worth.
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relief it should not furnish justification for fraud. The court also
rejected the pari delicto argument, reasoning that the punishment
inflicted by denial of an annulment is disproportionate to the offense
of premarital intercourse. Further, it felt that a denial of annulment
would, in effect, punish plaintiff for the laudable act of marrying
defendant, an action which he undertook to rectify the wrong which
would have resulted had her representation been true. The court
rejected defendant's deterrence argument by stating that if the current civil and criminal remedies and social pressures are not sufficient
to discourage premarital sex, denial of annulment will hardly be more
effective. The court concluded that when this small possibility of
deterrence is weighed against the reward to defendant for perpetrating the fraud and the punishment of plaintiff for attempting to
remedy his wrong, the equities are clearly in favor of granting an
annulment. The dissenting opinion favored the adoption of the majority position and stated that to grant the annulment "would open up a
new field to people inclined to throw off the relation and responsibility
of a sacred contract upon which the basis of our society rests."20
With this decision Kentucky joins New York and Wisconsin in
rejecting the "essential of the marriage" test, as well as the par!
delicto and social obligation arguments as applied to actions for
annulment on the grounds of fraud in the inducement to marry. The
approach taken by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in contrast to
the majority position, regards the marriage contract as containing the
attributes more generally found in a civil contract. Usually, a contract
of marriage is considered different from a simple civil contract in that
the state, because of its vital interest in marriage as an important
social institution, is a third party to the contract.21 The state's concern
with maintaining marital relationships is the principal reason for
requiring that fraud go to the "essentials" of the marriage before an
annulment will be granted. However, this same touchstone can be
employed to support the argument that the integrity of marriage as
an institution is better strengthened by allowing annulment of those
marriages which are fraudulently induced. If assistance is to be
sought from existing cases in developing realistic grounds for annulment consonant with our current values as to individual rights, the
New York experience appears to be the most promising. In
DiLorenzo, Shofeld, and Kober the New York courts stated that, in
actions for annulment on the ground of fraud in the inducement, the
20. 418 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Ky. 1967).
21. J.MADDEN, supra note 3, at 3-4.
22. The probable reason for the greater liberality of the New York courts in annulment proceedings is the very strict divorce laws which existed until 1967. See Note,
Annulment for Fraud in New York, 24 ALBANY L. Rnv. 125, 134-35 (1960).
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determining factor is that the fact intentionally misrepresented or
concealed by defendant was relied upon by plaintiff and that it
induced plaintiffs consent. The instant case appears to accept that
criterion. However, considering the very personal nature of the marriage contract, the appropriate criterion should be purely subjective:
that defendant's fraudulent activity induced this particular plaintiff
to enter the marriage. It is submitted that society gains little by
perpetuating a marriage in which one party was deceived into consenting; and that individual personal rights are eroded by tying the
defendant to a relationship, the severance of which the laws seek to
discourage through stringent divorce statutes.

Income Tax-Corporations-Attorneys' and Accountants'
Fees Incurred in Sale of Assets Pursuant to a
Section 337 Liquidation Are Not Deductible
Pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation under section 337 of
the Internal Revenue Code,' taxpayer corporation sold all of its assets
and incurred brokers' commissions and accountants' and attorneys'
fees, 2 for the sale, which it claimed as a deduction from ordinary income on its final federal income tax return. The District Director
disallowed the deductions on the ground that they represented capital
expenditures, and as such were not deductible from ordinary income.
After paying the deficiency, the corporation successfully sued for a
refund in district court, contending that the deductions were ordinary
and necessary business expenses. 3 On appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, held, reversed. Corporate expenditures directly related to a sale of its capital assets in the course of a complete
liquidation under section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code do
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 337. "Gain Or Loss On Sales Or Exchanges In

Connection With Certain Liquidations. (a) General Rule.-If-(1) a corporation adopts
a plan of complete liquidation . . . and (2) within the 12-month period beginning on
the date of the adoption of such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims, then no gain or loss
shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property
within such 12-month period."
2. The taxpayer, Alphaco, Inc., sold all of its assets at a gain in excess of
$1,000,000 during fiscal year 1960-61. On its income tax return for the same period
it took a deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses of $54,103.47, representing expenses (brokers' commissions and accountants' and attorneys' fees) incurred
in effectuating the sale of capital assets.
3. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162. "Trade Or Business Expenses. (a) In General.There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business . ... "
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not constitute business expenses deductible from ordinary income
reported in the corporation's final return. Alphaco, Inc. v. Nelson,
385 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1967).
Section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code was the product of
Congressional reaction to two Supreme Court decisions dealing with
corporate liquidation. In Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,4 the
Court held that where a corporation with two stockholders had
declared its only asset, an apartment house, as a liquidated dividend
and the stockholders then sold the asset to a purchaser who had
previously made an agreement to buy from the corporation, the
transaction was merely a tax avoidance scheme. Both the corporation
and the shareholder were held taxable on the gain, thus resulting in
a double tax. In the second decision, United States v. Cumberland
Public Service Co.,5 the Court reached the opposite result where a
similar liquidation was not accompanied by prior corporate sale
negotiations. Following these two decisions, Congress enacted section
337, intending to eliminate the distinction made by the Court in
reaching a contrary result in two substantively similar factual settings
which differed only in form. This intent was accomplished by eliminating the tax at the corporate level and imposing a single tax at the
shareholder level. Tax liability was thus no longer dependent on the
mere formality of distinguishing parties to the sales negotiations.6
Expenses incurred in producing such a sale are deductible only if
within the ambit of section 162 of the Code. Two lines of authority
have evolved as to the deductibility of legal and accounting fees
incident to a section 337 liquidation. In United States v. Mountain
States Mixed Feed Co.,7 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed
a deduction of all attorney's fees incurred during a section 337
liquidation, although the Commissioner had initially allowed the
deduction only to the extent of fees allocable to liquidation and
dissolution, and had disallowed legal fees incident to the sale of
capital assets. The court based its decision on previous cases,8 reasoning that "liquidations occur[red] with sufficient frequency in
4. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
5. 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
6. In analyzing the two decisions, Congress stated that "in order to eliminate questions resulting only from formalities, your committee has provided that if a corporation
in process of liquidation sells assets there will be no tax at the corporate level, but any
gain realized will be taxed to the distributee-shareholder, as ordinary income or capital
gain depending on the character of the asset sold." H.R. RPr. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 38-39 (1954). See also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2,58-59 (1954).
7. 365 F.2d 244 (l0th Cir. 1966).
8. In Pacific Coast Biscuit Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 39, 43 (1939), the court
stated "[W]e are of the opinion that costs of dissolution and liquidation are both
ordinary and necessary expenses within the meaning of the statute." Accord, Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1961); Gravois Planing Mill Co. v.
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business that a liquidation [was] an 'ordinary' event within the meaning of Welch v. Helvering9 and consequently their costs [were] 'ordinary' expenses within the meaning of Section 162 of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code." 10 Although expenses of liquidation do not concern
the creation or continuance of a capital asset,1 the court reasoned
further that it is probable that the attorneys could account for the
time they devoted to the corporate dissolution as distinguished from
the sale of the assets; however, there is no reason why this sale of
assets is not as much a part of the liquidation as the dissolution of
the corporation.' 2 A contrary position was advanced in Otto F.
Rupprecht,3 where the Tax Court disallowed deductions for broker's
commissions and attorney's fees incurred solely in the sale of assets, 14
on the ground that "the expenses involved were not costs of dissolving the corporation, but arose in connection with the sale of its
6
principal asset," 5 and thus were non-deductible capital costs.'
In the instant case the court relied on the "principle of tax law"
that under the scheme of the income tax statute, "related disbursements and receipts should be given consistent tax treatment."17 In
its analysis, the court noted that since under section 337 "capital
gain is given no recognition and has no tax incidence to the corporation, the costs of producing that gain should likewise be ignored." 8
Thus, the court reasoned, the section did not indicate a purpose to
transmute the selling costs from their normal character as capital
Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962) (partial liquidation); Commissioner v.
Wayne Coal Mining Co., 109 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1934); United States v. Arcade Co.,
203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1933).
9. 290 U.S. 111 (1933). The Court held that what is "ordinary" is "none the less a
variable affected by time and place and circumstance." Id. at 113-14.
10. United States v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., 363 F.2d 244, 245 (1966).
11. 4A J. MERmTEs, LAw OF FaEnmuL INCOm TAXATION § 25.35 (1967).
12. United States v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., 365 F.2d 244, 245 (1966).
13. 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 618 (1961).
14. Thus, in this case, as in the instant case, there was a liquidation, but no allocation problem as there was in Mountain.
15. 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 620 (1961).
16. See Winner v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 684 (1st Cir. 1967), holding that a
liquidating corporation disposing of its inventory in non-taxable bulk sale could not
compute cost of goods sold for income tax purposes, assuming that ending inventory
for year was zero, thus reducing the corporation's gross income by an amount equal
to the final inventory at date of sale and Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 180
F. Supp. 373 (Ct. Cl. 1960), holding that where a corporation adopted a plan of complete liquidation and shortly thereafter the corporation's principal manufacturing plant
was destroyed by fire and insurance proceeds resulted in a gain, the corporation was
exempt from the tax on the gain from the involuntary conversion, but attorney and
adjuster fees incurred in collection of insurance proceeds could be used only to reduce
gain, not as a deduction by the corporation from other income.
17. 385 F.2d at 245, quoting Spangler v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 913 (9th Cir.
1963).
18. Id.
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expenses into ordinary expenses, and therefore, to permit the taxpayer to deduct legal fees from ordinary income would be to confer
an additional tax benefit on the taxpayer-exactly what Congress had
sought to avoid in enacting section 337. The court therefore concluded that to allow a business expense deduction for costs incident
to the sale of capital assets would not only violate a basic principle
of income tax law, but would also be inconsistent with the purpose
for which section 337 was enacted.' 9
The instant case illustrates the clear division of authority as to
the treatment of selling expenses incident to a section 337 liquidation.
In holding these expenses non-deductible as ordinary and necessary
expenses, the instant court purports to distinguish Mountain States
Mixed Feed Co., relied upon by the taxpayer, by reasoning that the
Mountain court did not "examine the critical considerations."20 This
distinction is indefensible, since in its analysis, the court fails to give
due weight to the entire opinion of the Mountain case, particularly
the fact that the Commissioner there had allocated the lawyers' fees
between those incident to the liquidation in general and those properly allocated to the sale of capital assets. The Tenth Circuit then
unequivocally rejected this allocation-certainly a "critical consideration."2 1 However, the instant court's holding advocates such allocation and is, therefore, contrary to Mountain. Further, although the
Commissioner's position here is that expenses related to the sale of a
capital asset are "capital expenditures" and as such require an adjustment to basis under section 1016 of the Code,22 the Code takes no
position directly on this point.23 The corporation's contention that
its selling expenses were necessary and ordinary expenses was accepted in Mountain; but the instant court rejects this position, hingeing its opinion largely on the policy implications of section 337. The
court views this policy as requiring equal tax consequences regardless
of whether the corporation sells the asset or the asset is distributed
in liquidation and sold by the shareholders.2 4 An examination of
three alternative methods of dealing with expense deductions under
a 337 liquidation best illustrates this policy.25 First, the effect of al19. Id.
20. Id. at 247.
21. United States v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., 365 F.2d 244, 245 (1966).
22. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1016. "Adjustments To Basis. (a) General Rule.Proper adjustment in respect of the property shall in all cases be made-(1) for
expenditures, receipts, losses, or other items, properly chargeable to capital account. .. "
23. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162.
24. See note 6 supra.
25. Postulate the following factual situation: A soley owned corporation has as its
only asset an apartment house. Its fair market value is $100,000 and its basis is
$50,000. The basis of the stock owned by the shareholder is $10,000. The corpo-
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owing the corporation a deduction as an ordinary and necessary expense would be to lower the net profit of the corporation, thus reducing its tax and increasing the earnings and profits distributable
to the shareholder.2 Second, by disallowing the deduction, as in the
instant case, the corporation merely reduces the gain realized; but
since the gain realized is not recognized under section 337, the earnings and profits are not affected.!" Third, if the assets are distributed
to the shareholder in liquidation and the shareholder sells the asset
incurring the same legal expenses, he will adjust the basis of the
asset upward, thus realizing less.2 Since the allowance of a deduction to the corporation in the first alternative above would increase
the earnings and profits, the imbalance sought to be avoided by the
drafters of section 337 is again created. Viewed in this light the
instant court's holding seems to coincide with the policy of section
337. However, whether this policy is administratively feasible for
lawyers and accountants is questionable. As accurate time records
are the heart of effective office management,9 it is submitted that
to require lawyers to allocate their time during a liquidation between
"liquidation" and "sale of assets" matters (i.e. "planning expenses"
ration has in its cash account $50,000 and has net earnings of $50,000 for the
year to date. Expenses incident to the sale of the asset would be $5,000.
26. The following step transactions in relation to the factual situation given in note
25 supra would follow: (1) the cash account would be reduced by $5,000 (the
amount of the sales expense) leaving $45,000; (2) the tax on the net profits (now
$45,000 due to the deduction of the sales expenses) would be $22,500 (using 50%
rate for simplicity) leaving $27,500 for Earnings and Profits; (3) the $50,000 gain
realized on the sale of the apartment building will not be recognized to the corporation under § 337; (4) the corporation distributes in liquidation (a) $45,000 (cash
account), (b) $100,000 (from the asset), (c) $27,500 (Earnings and Profits) for
a total of $172,500, (5) the shareholder pays tax on $162,500 (total distribution less
basis of the shareholder's stock) or $40,625 leaving $131,875.
27. The following step transactions in relation to the factual situation postulated in
note 25 supra would follow: (1) the cash account would be reduced by $5,000
(the amount of the sales expense) leaving $45,000; (2) the tax on the net profits
would be $25,000 (using 50% rate) leaving $25,000 for the Earnings and Profits;
(3) the basic of the asset would be adjusted to $55,000 (sales expenses) leaving
$45,000 realized but not recognized; (4) the corporation distributes in liquidation
(a) $45,000 (cash account), (b) $100,000 (from the asset), (c) $25,000 (Earnings
and Profits) for a total of $170,000; (5) the shareholder pays tax on $160,000 (total
distribution less basis of shareholder's stock) or $40,000 leaving $130,000.
28. When the shareholder sells the asset distributed in liquidation the following
step transactions take place: (1) the corporation distributes to the shareholder in
liquidation (a) asset (fair market value of $100,000), (b) $50,000 (cash account),
(c) $25,000 (earnings and profits after the net profits have been taxed; (2) the
shareholder incurs the same expenses as the corporation; (3) the shareholder realizes
a gain of $160,000 (total distribution of $175,000 less basis of stock and sale expenses
in selling the asset); (4) the shareholder pays tax on $160,000 (amount realized) or
$40,000 leaving $130,000.
29. D. McCAm=, LAw OFFICE MANAGEMENT (1946).
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v. "expenses of putting the plan into effect") 30 would often be impractical, if not impossible. Even though this administrative difficulty

might outweigh the policy argument of section 337, it would seem

that the court's holding is better founded on that policy than upon

such a theoretical statement as "related disbursements and receipts
should be given consistent tax treatment."31

Interest-Usury-Charging Debtor with Statutory
Maximum Loan Fees Prohibited Unless Reasonably
Related to Services Rendered and Expenses
Incurred by Lender
Over a fourteen-month period, the debtor executed a series of five
promissory notes in favor of petitioner loan company, one of which,

the subject of the instant litigation, was an unsecured "claim note,"
executed on March 10, 1967.1 The face value of the claim note was
612 dollars payable in eighteen monthly installments of 34 dollars.

Petitioner designated 55.08 dollars of the face amount as interest and
deducted it in advance as allowed by statute.2 Petitioner charged the
debtor 24.48 dollars as a loan and investigation fee 3 and made the grant
30. 65 Mica. L. I.Ev. 1508, 1510 (1967).
31. 385 F.2d at 245.
1. The claim note, on its face, bears the following computation:
Date 3/10/67 Statement.
$612.00
Amount of note
Interest ..............................................
55.08
Loan Fee ........................................
24.48
Ins.: L 18.36
A & H 45.90........................
64.26
Ins.: Prop 18.36 ......................................
18.36
Unpaid bal. former loan ..............................
450.00
The claim note was executed before the immediately preceeding loan had been repaid
and constituted a loan of the amount necessary to pay the balance due on the prior
loan.
2. Industrial Loan and Thrift Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2007 (1964). In pertinent part, this section of the Act provides loan companies with the power "[tIo lend
money on the personal undertaking of a borrower or other persons, with or without
security including certificates of indebtedness or investment purchased by the borrower
simultaneously with said loan transaction, or otherwise, and to deduct interest in
advance on the face amount of the loan for the full term thereof." In the instant case,
$2.78 of the $34.00 monthly installment was a return of this pre-deducted interest
and $31.22 was a return of principal.
3. TENN. CODE ArN. § 45-2007(i) (1964). In pertinent part, allows loan companies
"[t]o charge for services rendered and expenses incurred in connection with investigating the moral and financial standing of the applicant, security for the loan, investigation of titles and other expenses incurred in connection with the closing of any
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of the loan conditional on the debtor's payment of 82.62 dollars
to cover the premium charges on health, accident, life, and property
insurance.4 On June 1, 1967, the debtor filed a Wage Earner's Petition
in a Chapter XIII Wage Earner Plan Proceeding.5 The Referee in
Bankruptcy approved the debtor's plan and on his own motion found
the petitioner's claim note usurious on its face in that the amount of
interest deducted in advance was in excess of the ten percent maximum allowed under the state constitution, 6 the loan and investigation
fee was excessive and unrelated to services rendered or expenses
actually incurred, and the debtor, without his assent, was charged
with insurance costs from which petitioner received substantial
profits.7 On appeal to the Federal District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee, held, affirmed. A claim note is usurious where
the charge for pre-deduction of interest exceeds the statutory limit,
the loan and investigation fee is not reasonably related to services
loan an amount not to exceed four dollars ($4.00) per each one hundred dollars
($100.00) of the principal amount loaned and or proportionate amount for any greater
or lesser amount loaned, provided no charge shall be collected unless a loan shall have

been made." In arriving at the instant charge, petitioner applied the statutory formula
to the face amount of the claim note ($612.00).
4. TENN. CoDE ANx. § 45-2007(k) (1964), allows lenders "to require at the
expense of the borrower, insurance against the hazards to which the collateral used to
secure the loan is subject, and upon failure of the borrower to supply such insurance,
to procure the same and to accept, but not require, as collateral, insurance against the
hazards of death or disability of a borrower; provided, however, that such insurance
shall be obtained . ..at rates approved by the department of insurance and banking
of the state of Tennessee, and provided that the amount of the loan and the type of
coverage bears a reasonable relation to the existing hazard or risk of loss."
5. Following the filing of the Wage Earner's Plan on June 1, 1967, the referee
ordered the petitioner to produce information concerning possible usurious features
of the claim note. The last order came on July 19, 1967, when the referee filed a
Memorandum Opinion setting forth the law of usury applicable to the loan company.
On July 21, the Wage Earner's Plan was approved. The loan company accepted the
Plan on July 24, but refused to comply with the referee's earlier orders to produce
information on the claim note. The loan company then petitioned the instant court
to set aside the Memorandum Opinion on the ground that the referee had approved
the debtor's plan and thus had no further power to inquire into the nature of the
claim note. The court ruled that the referee had power to make further inquiry into
the question of usury even though an order had been entered approving the plan.
The referee then scheduled hearings at which the opinion on instant appeal was
rendered. The petitioner sought the permission of the referee to withdraw its claim
with prejudice, which the referee denied. The petitioner then amended its claim to
"zero," and moved that the hearings not be conducted. That motion was also denied.
6. TENN.CONST. art. 11, § 7.
7. The petitioner denied that the claim note was usurious and also contended: (1)
that under U.S.C. § 1056(b) the referee had no power to inquire into the issue of
usury after confirming the Plan, in the absence of objections to the claim by the
debtor, trustee, or another creditor; (2) that the reduction of the claim to "zero"
rendered further proceedings moot; and (3) that the referee prejudged the issues,
was antagonistic toward the loan company and its attorney, and that his opinion
should be considered advisory only.
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rendered or expenses incurred by the lender, and the requirement that
the debtor pay insurance charges as a condition precedent for the
granting of the unsecured loan is prohibited by statute. In re Bogan,
No. BK 67-1811 (W.D. Tenn. 1968).
Usury, broadly defined as the intentional exaction of more compensation than is allowed by law in return for the loan of money, 8
is a subject entirely regulated by statute. While usurious charges on
small loans are forbidden in most states,9 the statutes regulating the
general conduct of the loan industries are nonetheless so heavily
biased in favor of the lender that the prohibitions on usury are often
rendered impotent.10 The reason for this statutory bias has been
due partly to a strong lobby and partly to the realization that in our
society money lending takes place in a competitive market situation.
A predominant theory concerning the dynamics of the loan market
asserts that usury statutes cannot realistically limit the interest rate,
because economic laws of supply and demand may dictate a rate
higher than the statutory maximum. If such a statutory limitation
were strictly applied, then whenever the market price of money
exceeded the point at which the maximum allowable interest would
yield a profit, the moneylender would simply be forced to terminate
his lending operations. This, of course, produces the unsatisfactory
result of denying the needy borrower a source of funds." This theory
has led legislatures to adopt certain measures which ameliorate the
restrictive effects of the statutory maximum interest rate and allow the
lender to emerge with a profit in almost any market situation, thus
protecting the sources of credit so necessary in an expanding, consumer-oriented economy. Among these measures has been the raising
of the statutory maximum interest to a level which may exceed the
rate which the market dictates.12 Another measure has been to allow
the lender to impose various service charges and investigation fees,
and to utilize profit maximizing methods of computing interest. 3
8. 91 C.J.S. Usury § 13, at 583 (1955). See Jenkins v. Dugger, 96 F.2d 727, 729
(6th Cir. 1938), a typical usury case in which it was held that "[a] contract is
usurious when there is any contingency by which the lender may get more than the
lawful rate of interest . . . . From the Mosaic laws to the present .. .the weight of
every law on the subject has fallen on the possibility of the receipt by the lender
of more than the law allowed ...."
9. A fairly recent survey shows that 13 states have a maximum interest rate of 6%
per annum; 27 have rates ranging from 7-11% and 9 states allow 12% or more.
See Meth, A Contemporary Crisis: The Problem of Usury in the United States, 44
A.B.A.J. 637, 638 (1958).
10. Testimony by Prof. David Caplivitz, New York Attorney General's Hearings on
Truth-In-Lending, 22 PERSONAL Fir. LAw Q. REPoRT 11 (1967).
11. See Shanks, PracticalProblems in the Application of Archaic Usury Statutes, 53
VA. L. REv. 327 (1967); Meth, supra note 9.
12. See note 9 supra.
13. An excellent example of how these varied methods of interest computation
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Still another measure has been to impose relatively slight penalties
for usurious transactions.' 4 In recent years, however, there has been
a growing concern among legislatures and courts with abuses resulting
from this creditor bias, sparked by the fact that over the past decade

the increase in consumer debt has been matched by a concomitant

rise in the rate of personal bankruptcies. 15 Several states have recently

enacted "truth-in-lending" legislation designed to inform the public

of the actual costs of credit, 16 and to curb some of the more flagrant
usurious practices of loan companies, such as unlimited renewals of
loans. 17 As the instant case illustrates, courts have also become more
operate is found in a comparison of the "add-on" and "discount" (used in the instant
case) methods of calculation. Suppose a company offers a $100 loan at an advertised rate of 6% interest per annum. Under the "add-on" method the debtor would
be charged $6.00 interest, pre-computed, which would be added to the principal thus
requiring repayment of $106.00 at $8.83 per month. The debtor receives the use of
$100. Under the "discount" method, however, the $6.00 interest would be discounted
from the principal and the debtor would pay back $100 at $8.33 per month, receiving
the use of only $94.00. It would seem that the "add-on" method is preferable to the
debtor because he gets the use of more money at the same amount of interest.
However, it should be noted that under the "add-on" method the true annual interest
would approach 12% rather than the advertised 6% rate. Under the discount rate it
would be even higher. This is so because under both methods the debtor does not
have the use of the principal for the entire year. By the end of the sixth month, he
will have repaid half of the principal, whereas under 6% true annual interest he
would have had the use of the principal for the entire period. See Note, Truth in
Lending, 18 V. mn. L. REv. 856, 858 (1965).
14. As to statutory penalties for usury, thirteen states provide for forfeiture of
interest in excess of the statutory maximum, eighteen provide for forfeiture of all
interest, eight provide for a forfeiture of a multiple of interest or of excess interest, one
declares forfeiture of 8% of principal and all interest, and five declare forfeiture of
interest and principal. In seventeen states usury is also considered a crime or misdemeanor. See Meth, supranote 9, at 638.
15. Costello, Chairman of N.Y. Mayor's Council on Consumer Affairs Presents Views
on "Truth-In-Lending," 22 PmnsoNAr. FiN. LAw Q. REPORT 13 (1967). The current
bankruptcy rate is more than twice that of the depression years and almost 90 percent
of these are personal bankruptcies. Note, Truth in Lending, 18 VAND. L. REv. 856, 857
(1965).
16. Disclosure to the debtor of all costs incident to a loan transaction is now required
in at least 6 states by statutes enacted since 1966. See, e.g., Ifri. REv. STAT. ch. 74,
§ 4(g) (1967) amendment; MAss. GEN. LAws § ch. 140A 1-5 (1966). 45 TENN. CODE
ANNt. § 2106 (1968) amendment), enacted just after the decision in the instant case
was rendered is typical in providing that the lender must provide the debtor with a
"written statement showing in clear and distinct terms: (a) the date of the loan;
(b) the schedule of payments on the loan; (c) the amount of interest charged; (d)
the amount charged for making and servicing of the loan; (e) an itemization of disbursements made on behalf of the borrower, including all insurance premiums paid."
17. Many lenders are reported to engage freely in practice of renewals or "flipping."
Under this practice, the debtor who has repaid a portion of a loan is allowed to make
another loan, which includes the balance still due on the old loan, on which all
allowable charges (precomputed interest, investigation fees, etc.) have already been
made. Then the full amount of allowable charges is again imposed on the new
principal amount. 45 TEuN. CODE ANN. § 2010(k) (1968 amendment) was amended
to prohibit flipping just after the decision in the instant case was rendered.
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active in protecting the debtor from usurious loan charges.1 8

Holding that the referee had the power to determine whether the

claim note was usurious, 19 the instant court moved to a consideration

of whether the amount deducted for advance interest in the claim

note was excessive.2 0 The court found that since the deduction of the

55.08 dollars in advance interest left the debtor with the use of only
556.92 dollars, the precomputed interest thus amounted to approxi-

mately twelve percent per annum, due to the declining balance.
Though recognizing that precomputed interest is statutorily permis-

sible,21 the instant court reasoned that the amount of interest which

could be charged by this method was limited to the ten percent per
annum maximum allowed by the state constitution.22 Thus, the court
cluded, the claim note was usurious on its face.23 Turning to a con18. See, e.g., Nash v. State, 271 Ala. 173, 123 So. 2d 24 (1960); Cochran v. State,
270 Ala. 440, 119 So. 2d 339 (1960). In both cases the courts held that small loan
laws against usury could not be evaded by charging and retaining exorbitant insurance premiums. In Sosebee v. Boswell, 242 Ark. 396, 414 S.W.2d 380 (1967), a case
involving charges for services rendered and expenses incurred by the lender in making
a loan, it was held that such charges were usurious where they constituted the lenders'
"overhead" business expenses.
19. In holding that the referee had the power to pursue the usury issue even after
he had approved the Wage Earner's Plan, the instant court found that a bankruptcy
court could reject in whole or in part claims previously allowed. The court cited
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939), and American A.&B. Coal Corp. v.
Leonardo Arrivabene, S.A., 280 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1960), in support of this proposition.
Further, the court found that the petitioner's reduction of the claim to zero did not
render the proceeding moot nor had the referee been guilty of antagonistic conduct
toward petitioner or its counsel.
20. For a definition of usury the instant court cited Jenkins v. Dugger, 96 F.2d
727, 729 (7th Cir. 1938), which stated: "Usury imports the existence of four elements:
(1) A loan or forbearance, either express or implied; (2) an understanding between
the parties that the principal shall be repayable absolutely; (3) the exaction of a
greater profit than allowed by law; and (4) an intention to violate the law. The
last may be implied if the first three are present."
21. See note 2 supra.
22. Tmi. CoNsT. art. 11, § 7, provides as follows: "The Legislature shall fix the
rate of interest, and the rate so established shall be equal and uniform throughout the
State; but the Legislature may provide for a conventional rate of interest not to
exceed ten per centum. per annum." The court cited Pugh v. Hermitage Loan Co.,
167 Tenn. 389, 70 S.W.2d 22 (1934), as authority for the proposition that this section
of the constitution should control the loans in the instant case.
23. Though recognizing that the loan company had realized a "shocking profit" by
the process of renewal (a loan to repay the balance still due on the previous loan)
since interest from the prior loan was incorporated into the principal amount of the
new loan, the court refused to hold this usurious where effectuated by agreement, citing
Parham v. Pulliam, Executor, 45 Tenn. 497 (1868), and Crowley v. Kolsky, 57 S. W.
386 (Tenn. Ch. 1900). Stating that it would leave the problem to be solved by the
legislature the instant court outlined in detail how the renewal process (often called
"flipping;" see note 17 supra and accompanying text) could result in such a profit.
In the instant case the debtor was charged $48.60 interest, deducted in advance and
payable in 15 monthly installments, on the $540.00 prior loan. When the claim note
was executed, the debtor was refunded $9.54 of the $48.60. The difference, $39.06,
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sideration of the loan and investigation fee, the instant court found
that the maximum statutory fee formula (4 dollars per 100 dollars of
the principal amount loaned)2 had been applied to the full face
amount of the claim note, yielding an investigation fee of 24.48
dollars. Noting that this fee comprised part of the full face value of
the claim note, the court concluded that the petitioner had charged
the debtor a fee which was, in part, on the fee itself. The court
concluded that while the legislature intended that the loan fee could
be borrowed in order to complete the transaction, the fee itself could
not be included in the principal amount to which the statutory
formula was applied. Therefore, to the extent that petitioner applied
the statutory formula to a principal amount including the borrowed
fee, the petitioner realized excessive and usurious compensation. The
court reasoned further that the loan and investigation fee bore no
reasonable relation to the expenses and services of the petitioner in
connection with the claim note. The maximum loan fee was charged
for each of the five loans made to the debtor, and the loans were all
made within such a short period of time that the need for intensive
investigation of the latter loans should have lessened. From these'
circumstances the court concluded that a prima facie case of usury
could be made against the petitioner due to its arbitrary application
of the maximum loan fee to each loan regardless of the fact that the
actual expense of investigating the debtor was much less than the
maximum allowable by statute.25 As to the insurance charges assessed
against the debtor by the petitioner, the court found that one of
petitioner's officials was also an agent for the insurance companies
involved, and was allowed 50 per cent of the premium charge (less
any refunds of premiums) as a commission. Recognizing the obvious
profit realized by the petitioner in these transactions, and noting that,
was included in the $450.00 designated as the unpaid balance of the former loan.
By including the $39.06 remaining interest on the previous loan in the principal
amount of the present loan, petitioner actually obligated the debtor to pay $39.06
interest for the use of the $90.00 which had been repaid on the previous loan. An
additional $55.08 interest was charged on the present loan. Thus, if the obligation on
the claim note had been met as scheduled, petitioner would have received a return
on the $90.00 at a rate in excess of 50% per annum.
24. See note 3 supra.
25. The instant court reasoned that the maximum fee could not be charged unless
it bore a reasonable relation to the services rendered or expenses incurred, citing: Family
Loan Co. v. Hickerson, 168 Tenn. 36 (1934); Personal Fin. Co. v. Hammack, 163
Tenn. 641 (1932); Koen v. State, 162 Tenn. 573 (1931). Each of these cases construed the Small Loan Act, 45 TENN. CoDE ANN. § 2101-23. The holding of the
Hammack case is typical. There the court held that moneylenders are not empowered
to contract arbitrarily for the service fees and charges to the maximum limit fixed by
the Small Loan Act; but that the fees and charges must bear a reasonable relation to
the expense and services of the lender in the transaction. The Small Loan Act applies
only to loans of $300 or less.
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contrary to statute, the petitioner required the debtor to obtain the

insurance as a condition to receiving the loan, 26 the court decided
that the petitioner had illegally acquired additional usurious profit on
the loan.2
Usury regulation is generally more amenable to legislative than
judicial reform. The decision in the instant case is commendable,
however, as an example of an activist court entering into an area in
which the law has been much abused. Of particular importance is
the fact that the court, in determining the legality of the loan and
investigation fee, was willing to look beyond the lender's compliance

with statutory form and examine the substantive facts of the situation
to determine whether the fee charged was reasonably related to the
actual expenses incurred by the lender in servicing the loan. In so
doing, the court effectively dealt with this onerous aspect of the
"flipping" scheme, in which the maximum investigation fee allowable
under statute is charged for each renewal even though there is no
reasonable basis for the fee.28 Though applying the statutory standard
to decide whether the advance interest deduction was usurious, the
instant court presented significant dicta, voicing concern over the

abuses to which borrowers are subjected when such deductions are
incorporated into the practice of "flipping."29 Thoroughly analyzing
the inequity of flipping in the area of pre-deducted interest, the court
26. See note 4 supra. Construing the statute, the court held that the portion of the
Act allowing a loan company to require hazard insurance to protect collateral was
inapplicable because the instant loan was unsecured.
27. Though not deciding the case on this point, the court noted with approval a
case which disallowed profit from insurance required by a loan company official where
the official was also an agent of the insurance company due to the fraudulent overtones of such a transaction. See Hagler v. American Road Ins. Co., (unreported case
recently decided by the Tennessee Court of Appeals). The instant court also found
that the debtor was given insufficient information about the insurance by the petitioner,
and concluded that the debtor could not be bound by any authorization form he had
signed because he was illiterate and unaware of its meaning.
28. The practice which the instant court struck down is prevalent: "To keep
operations prima facie legal, the loan companies have developed ways and means of
charging usurious rates without such practices appearing on the face of their records.
Since the statutes under which lenders operate provide a maximum service charge that
may be exacted from the borrower for investigating the latter's moral and financial
standing, one such device is to charge the maximum service charge allowed by law
although it may bear no reasonable relation to expenses actually incurred." Note,
Usury: Small Loan Companies in Tennessee, 26 TFNN. L. REv. 279, 284 (1959).
This imposition of the maxilnum service charges is one of the more obvious ways a
loan company can gain an unfair and excessive profit on its loans through utilization of
the "flipping" process. See note 17 supra. While Tennessee courts have stated that
a maximum statutory fee cannot be charged without its having a reasonable relation to
services rendered or expenses incurred, the instant case is the first to attack the
problem as it arises under the practice of "flipping." See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
29. See notes 17 & 23 supra.
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urged legislative action to stop the practice.30 The court also recog-

nized, by way of dicta, the harm resulting to the borrower through the
general failure of the loan industry to disclose adequately the real

cost of loan transactions. 31 It is submitted that the instant court has

followed an exemplary course, one which is certainly in line with the

recent trend toward providing the borrower with greater protection
against usurious practice. The importance of judicial vigilance be-

comes readily apparent when it is realized that even the most stringent
disclosure statutes can have at best only limited success in protecting
the debtor. In many instances, the victim of usurious charges is
"unsophisticated, uneducated, and foolish. He is often the person who

is least able to benefit from detailed disclosure provisions."

2

Further-

more, because the loan industry operates in a competitive market,
supported by capital investors, the urge to maximize profit will be

strong, and will no doubt lead resourceful lenders to continue to
impose maximum legal rates and charges regardless of their reason-

ableness. Flipping will continue in states where it is not prohibited
by statute, and, in states where it is prohibited, it is reasonable to

assume that other methods will be devised to allow the lender to
increase his profits-always at the expense of the debtor.33 While

recognizing that the legislature should lead the way in combating
usury, the instant court demonstrates how the power of equity can

and should be employed in protecting the debtor from the abuses of
unscrupulous members of the small loan industry.
30. Though perhaps by coincidence, flipping was prohibited by the Tennessee Legislature on March 14, 1968-just a few weeks after this decision was rendered. See
note 17 supra.
31. See note 16 supra.
32. Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 MicH. L.
REv. 1285, 1321 (1966). Though the new Tennessee statutory revisions represent a
great advance in debtor protection it should be noted that the disclosure section does
not provide a statutory standard to force lenders to disclose accurately the true costs
of credit to the debtor. The amendment provides simply for disclosure of "the amount
of interest charged." Clearly the lender will still be able to compute interest by any
one of several methods, none of which accurately reflects the true cost of credit
either on an actual dollar basis or on a simple annual interest charge basis. Consequently, deception of the borrower will still be a problem. See note 13 supra. A disclosure statute designed to provide the maximum possible protection to the debtor
should "enable the consumer first, to judge whether an extension of credit is worth the
price he must pay for it, and second, to shop effectively for credit." Buerger, Disclosure
of Finance Charges in Credit Transactions, 21 PFRSONAL FIN. LAw Q. 13EPORT 45
(1967). The Tennessee disclosure provision does not adequately fulfill the descriptiveshopping function which ideally it should, and as a result does not offer adequate protection even to those debtors who would be capable of intelligently utilizing such detailed disclosure.
33. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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Labor Law-Authorization Cards-Doubt of Union
Majority Based on Cards Found to Meet Good
Faith Requirements in Spite of Employer
Unfair Labor Practices
Food Store Employees Union, Local 347 obtained signed authorization cards and sought recognition as the exclusive bargaining rep-

resentative of a majority of the employees of the defendant, S. S.
Logan Packing Co.' The employer responded to the union's demand
for recognition by filing charges of coercive practices2 with the National Labor Relations Board. The union countercharged that the

employer had violated sections 8(a)(1) 3 and 8(a)(5) 4 of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board concluded that since defendant

had no "good faith doubt" of the union's majority status, it had violated section 8(a) (5), and issued an order requiring the defendant
to bargain with the union On appeal to the Courts of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, held, enforcement denied in part. In the absence

of outageous unfair labor practices, a representation election is required if an employer, having a good faith doubt, refuses to
authorization cards as determinative of a union's majority
NLRB v. S. S. Logan Packing Company, 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir.
Before 1947 there were two methods by which employees

accept
status.
1967).
could

select their exclusive bargaining representatives. The most common
was the secret ballot election provided for in section 9(c)6 of the

NLRA, which enabled any interested party to petition for an election
conducted by the Board under careful regulation designed to prevent
coercion by either participating employees or management. In addition, section 9(c) also gave the Board power to "utilize any other
1. Four years earlier the same union had lost a consent election.
2. The alleged coercive practices consisted of threats made to obtain signatures on
authorization cards in violation of section 8(b)(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1964).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964), provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer to coerce or interfere with employees exercising their right to organize
and bargain collectively.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964), provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer to refuse to participate in collective bargaining with the representative
of his employees.
5. S. S. Logan Packing Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 421 (1965).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964), stating that when a petition is filed by an employee
or group of employees, or an individual or labor organization acting in their behalf,
alleging that a substantial number of employees wish to be represented for purposes of
collective bargaining, and it is determined that a representation question in fact exists,
the Board should direct an election by secret ballot. This section also provides for an
election request by an employer who has been confronted %vitha bargaining request
from an individual or union.
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suitable method to ascertain such representative."7 One such method
was the authorization card procedure. In Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 8
the Supreme Court held that where an employer refused to recognize
a union claiming to hold authorization cards which entitled it to
represent a majority of employees, the NLRB could properly issue a
compulsory bargaining order if (1) the union attained a majority
representative status and, (2) the refusal to bargain was improper.9
However, in 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act 10 revised section 9(c) by
eliminating the "suitable method" alternative, thus giving rise to a
strong implication that election was the only proper procedure for
selection of the bargaining representative." In many instances, however, the courts ignored this supposed presumption in favor of
election 2 and relied instead upon the construction of section 9(a) of
the Act which provides that "[r]epresentatives, designated or selected"
by the majority of employees may be recognized as the proper
bargaining representative. 13 Thus, despite the Taft-Hartley revision,
courts under certain circumstances have allowed the union to circumvent the section 9(c) election procedure by use of authorization
cards. However, even if the union was a proper representative under
section 9(a), in order for the compulsory bargaining remedy to be
employed under the Franks Bros. rationale, it was necessary first to
make an improper refusal to bargain; the refusal was improper unless
the employer had a good faith doubt that the union lacked status as
a majority representative. In Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB 14 the
Supreme Court scrutinized the employer's motivation at the time of his
initial refusal to bargain, and determined that bad faith could be
established by showing the improbability of a "good faith doubt" as
to the validity of a card majority, or by showing employer conduct
tending to dissipate the union's strength subsequent to such refusal. 15
Thus, where the employer committed an unfair labor practice after
refusing to recognize a card majority, a presumption arose that the
7. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 453 (1935).
8. 321 U.S. 702 (1944). The Court found the bargaining order permissible under §
10(c) of the Act which allows the Board to fashion appropriate remedies.
9. Note, Union Authorization Cards,75 YALE L.J. 805, 809-10 (1966).
10. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
11. The majority and minority reports seem to indicate that the revision served to
grant the employer an absolute right to an election. Note, supra note 9, at 820,
interpreting S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 25, pt. 2, at 11 (1947).
12. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 72 n.8 (1956),
is a prime example of the denial of a strict interpretation of Taft-Hartley ignoring the
negative implications of the 9(c) revision.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964). It has been suggested that both the designated
and selected categories refer to elections-"designated" to the single union, "selected"
to the multi-union election.
14. 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
15. Note, supra note 9, at 811-12.
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prior refusal to recognize was in bad faith. 16 This presumption practically precluded the employer who committed an unfair labor
practice from proving good faith doubt under the Joy Silk test. On
the other hand, if the union, with knowledge of employer unfair
labor practices resorted to an election rather than an order to bargain,
the result of the election would be final regardless of any pre-election
unfair labor practice by the employer. 17 In Bernel Foam Products
Co.,' 8 the NLRB gave further impetus to authorization cards as an
effective tool by which a union might gain recognition. The Board
held that where the employer engaged in unfair labor practices
during the election procedure, the election was not determinative
if the union lost, and the union which had obtained authorization
cards could request an order to bargain. However, despite this decision, the Board has not been overly permissive in extending the
use of the compulsory bargaining remedy. In fact, the present trend
seems to indicate a greater reliance on the election procedure. 19 Although in a 1961 case 20 the Board seemed to reject specifically the
employer's absolute right to an election, by holding that a refusal to
bargain can only be justified by a doubt "which has some objective
warrant," 2' there has been a distinct withdrawal from this position,
and in several instances the Board has refused to infer bad faith
from a denial of recognition based upon a failure to accept authorization cards as proof of a valid majority.2
In the instant case the court found that in order to insure a free
and unfettered choice of the bargaining unit there must be an election
by secret ballot conducted under "laboratory conditions." The court
recognized that, although the Act provides for such an election as the
exclusive means of choice, there is a decisional rule which circumvents the election procedure, allowing authorization cards to replace
the secret ballot. In attacking this decisional rule the court stated
that there is no more unreliable method than authorization cards for
16. See Colson Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 827, 829 (1964), enforced, 347 F.2d 128 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904 (1965).
17. Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954). The theory behind this decision
was that the card procedure and election procedure were inconsistent. See also Note,
33 U. CHm. L. REv. 387, 401-2 (1966).
18. 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964). The Board reaffirmed the use of the bad faith
presumption used in Joy Silk. This decision also had the effect of preventing an
employer from relying on a re-run election.
19. Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65
MIcr. L. REv. 851, 852 (1967).
20. Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
This case has been strictly confined to its facts.
21. Lesnick, supra note 19, at 852.
22. H & W Const., 161 N.L.R.B. 77 (1966); Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077
(1966); Strydel, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966).
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determining the wishes of the employer2 5 Consequently, the court
reasoned that an employer could not help but doubt the reliability
of card checks, especially when reinforced by knowledge that the
union had engaged in unfair labor practices. 24 An employer investiga-%
tion will usually tend to confirm rather than negate a good faith
doubt.2 5 The court concluded that there is no legal basis for precluding an employer who commits an unfair labor practice subsequent to a
bargaining request from asserting his good faith doubt. However,
the court expressly reserved the right to enforce an 8(a) (5) order in
extraordinary cases of employer misconduct.
As opposed to elections, the authorization card check has several
obvious shortcomings, not the least of which is the absence of secrecy
to the employee in making his ultimate choice.2 6 In the instant case,
the employer had adequate grounds for a good faith doubt based
upon both the union's past failure to gain representation and the
employer's own investigation, which in all probability would have
rebutted even the bad faith presumption raised by the Joy Silk test.
This ground alone may justify the instant court's result. The court
however launched a diatribe against the reliability of authorization
cards and in the process effectively limited the section 8(a) (5)
bargaining order to situations of "outrageous" employer abuse.27 Thus,
a union which fails to prove such outrageousness must win an election
to become the exclusive bargaining representative. In view of the
fact that this union had lost a previous consent election, the result
of an election in this case will most probably be the final rejection
of the union as the bargaining representative. If the instant decision
is followed, one alternative open to the union-the use of authorization
23. The court stated: "Overwhelming majorities may indicate a probable outcome
of an election; but it is no more than an indication, and close card majorities prove
nothing. . . . Cards are collected over a period of time, however, and there is no
assurance that an early signer is still of the same mind on the crucial date when the
union delivers its bargaining demand." 386 F.2d at 565-66.
24. Here the employer not only had evidence of interference by card solicitors but
also the union defeat in the prior election.
25. Regarding employer investigation conducted to determine the validity of his
doubt, the court stated that minimally coercive practices will have no effect on the
§ 8(a)(5) issue.
26. As a result, the employee may be exposed to numerous forms of coercion. Thus,
the loss of anonymity may lead the employee to sign a card in order to protect himself
from harassment. E.g., Peterson Bros., 144 N.L.R.B. 679 (1963). He may simply
acquiesce due to the internal pressure which emanates from a feeling of unfaithfulness
to fellow employees. This type of practice may lead to haphazard card signing. Another shortcoming is that the privilege of free speech guaranteed to the employer
by section 8(c) of the Act may be denied him due to the fact,that he may be unaware
of the organization drive until the very moment that he is presented with the demand
for recognition.
27. NLRB v. S. S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 568 (4th Cir. 1967). The
bargaining order is referred to as an extraordinary remedy.
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cards, on the one hand, or an election, on the other-may be severely
weakened by unduly restricting the usefulness of authorization cards.
Further, the "outrageous and pervasive" test laid down by the instant
court as the means of obtaining a compulsory bargaining order might
encourage the employer to commit unfair labor practices which approach the brink of outrageous abuse but which could be interpreted as permissible employer conduct. An employer also might
easily disguise his improper motive by claiming good faith doubt
and alleging various types of union coercive practices. It is doubtful
that the Taft-Hartley Act was intended to eliminate authorization
cards2a to create a rigid technical process that would provide a loophole for management abuse, thus stifling unionization. It is submitted
that, in the presence of employer unfair labor practices, card majorities
must be given some measure of viability in order to prevent the
employer from using a restrictive interpretation of the Act to sterilize
unionization efforts.

Procedure-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Federal Interpleader-Claims Under Rule 13(g)
May Be Asserted in an Action in Interpleader
Only to Attack the Cross-Claim Defendant's
Claim Against the Common Fund
A bus owned by Queen City Coach Company collided with an
automobile in North Carolina, killing the automobile driver and his
passengers and injuring several bus passengers. The automobile insurer, Allstate Insurance Company, instituted an interpleader action
under the Federal Interpleader Act 1 to obtain an equitable and conclusive distribution of the proceeds payable under the policy.2 Named
as defendants in interpleader were Queen City Coach Company, a
North Carolina corporation; the bus driver, a North Carolina resident; each of the injured bus passengers, who were from various
states;3 and the administrator of the estates of the two passengers
28. Sobeloff, J., concurring, in NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson & Co., 386 F.2d 551, 555

(4th Cir. 1967).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964).
2. The deceased insured was a resident of South Carolina.
named as a defendant in the interpleader action.
3. The passengers named as defendants in interpleader were
states: three from Virginia; one each from Delaware, New Jersey,
remainder from North Carolina. Brief for Appellants at 22, Allstate
382 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1967).

His estate was not
from the following
and Texas; and the
Ins. Co. v. McNeill,
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in the insured's automobile, residents of South Carolina. In addition
to the defendants' claims against the fund, the administrator crossclaimed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 13(g)4
against Queen City and the bus driver, residents of the forum state,
for the death of his intestates.5 Queen City and the bus driver filed
motions for the dismissal of the interpleader action and the crossclaims, which motions were denied by the district court.6 On appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held,
allowance of the cross-claims reversed. Cross-claims under FRCP
13(g) may be asserted in an action in interpleader only to attack
the cross-claim defendant's claims against the common fund. Allstate
Insurance Co. v. McNeill, 382 F.2d 84 (1967) .7
Cross-claims between claimants in interpleader actions were not
adjudicated in the federal courts until the liberalization of the interpleader requirements in the Federal Interpleader Act of 19368 and
the establishment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. 9
Although thirty years have passed since the cross-claim remedy was
made available in FRCP 13(g), the development of its use in inter4. "Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim
by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to
any property that is the subject matter of the original action. Such cross-claim may
include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the
cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the crossclaimant."
5. The cross-claim was for a total of $351,500: $200,000 for the wrongful death
of the first passenger; $150,000 for the wrongful death of the second passenger; and
$1,500 for the conscious pain and suffering of the second passenger whose death
from the collision was not immediate. Brief for Appellants at 31, Allstate Ins. Co. v.
McNeill, 382 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1967).
6. From the order of Algernon L. Butler, Chief Judge of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, on June 15, 1966: "[T]he Court
concluding . . . as a matter of law that the service of cross-complaint . . . is proper;

and the Court further concluding as a matter of law that the subject matter of the
said cross-claim derives from the same transaction or occurrence as the transaction
or occurrence involved in the interpleader action and that this court has jurisdiction
over said cause of action as asserted in the cross-complaint ancillary to the jurisdiction
of this court in the principal interpleader action; and this Court concluding as a
matter of law that said cross-action should not be dismissed or stricken ....... Brief
for Appellants at 18, Allstate Ins. Co. v. McNeill, 382 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1967).
7. The attorneys for the administrator have petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for writ of certiorari on grounds that the general usage of rule 13(g) crossclaims in interpleader actions is in need of clarification; that the fourth circuit majority
misapplied the holding in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967);
and that the Rule 13(g) cross-claim in this instance should have been granted in the
interests of the efficient administration of justice. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 41(26) (1940 ed.), now28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964).
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 723(b), 723(c), now 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). Professor Chaffee
states that adjudication of additional controversies in interpleader actions occurred
prior to this time only in a few state cases. Chaffee, Broadening the Second Stage of
Interpleader, 56 Hnv. L. Rnv. 541 (1943).
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pleader actions has been slow due to the infrequent assertion of
cross-claims between interpleader claimants. 10 Generally, with respect
to subject matter jurisdiction, cross-claims may be asserted between claimants in interpleader if the rule 13(g) requirement"1 that
the cross-claim arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as
the interpleader action is satisfied. Subject matter jurisdiction of the
2
cross-claim is said to be ancillary to that of the interpleader action.'
With respect to personal jurisdiction, there need be no diversity of
citizenship between the parties to the cross-claim if the court has
personal jurisdiction over the claimants either under rule 22(1) or
under the Federal Interpleader Act.'3 But personal jurisdiction over
10. Professor Chaffee states that the possibility of additional controversies between
claimants in interpleader was not even considered by the drafters of the Federal Interpleader Act of 1936. Chaffee, Broadening the Second Stage of Federal Interpleader,
56 HAav. L. REv. 929, 944-45 (1943).
11. See note 4, supra.
12. Kerrigan's Estate v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 199 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1952);
3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRA=CTcE f 22.15, at 3131 (2d ed. 1966).
13. The differing jurisdictional requirements are set forth in detail in 3 J. MoonrE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1111
22.04(2), 22.09(1) & 22.09(2), at 3015, 3054 & 3059 (2d ed.
1966). The following table is taken from Robinson, The Use of Federal Interpleader
in Casualty Insurance Cases, 32 INS. CouNsErL J. 446, 452 (1965):
CONCISE COMPARISON OF INTERPLEADER REMEDY UNDER
FEDERAL INTERPLEADER ACT AND RULE 22(1) F.R.C.P.
Federal Interpleader Act

Rule 22(1)

Jurisdiction

(a) Amount in controversy must
exceed $500.00
(b) Must be diversity between
at least one claimant and
the others.

(a) Amount in controversy must
exceed $10,000.00.
(b) Must be diversity of citizenship between plaintiff-stakeholder and the claimants.

Deposit

Policy limits or bond therefor.

No deposit required.

Venue

District court where one or more
of the claimants reside,

District court of the state where
all of the claimants reside or
where the plaintiff-stakeholder
resides.

Process

May be served on claimants anywhere in the United States by
the marshals of the respective
districts involved,

Must be served under Rule 4(f)
F.R.C.P., on claimants residing
in the state in which the district
court sits.

Admission of
Liability

Denial of liability limited.

Admission of liability not required.

Injunction

District court may restrain and
enjoin proceedings involving fund
in state and federal courts.

District court may enjoin state
court proceedings if court considers injunction necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction or to protect
and effectuate its judgment.
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the parties to the cross-claim has been deemed to be limited, for
courts have recognized possible hardship to cross-claim defendants
and have established a number of limitations on the availability of
the cross-claim in interpleader actions. For convenience of analysis
and classification of these limitations, the cases may be divided into
two categories, 14 as follows: (1) those interpleader actions in which
the cross-claim defendant is not a resident of the forum state; and
(2) those interpleader actions in which the cross-claim defendant is
a resident of the forum state. When the cross-claim defendant is a
non-resident, courts have been extremely reluctant to allow the crossclaim to be asserted. The basis reason given for disallowance of such
cross-claims is that the court has jurisdiction over the person of the
non-resident cross-claim defendant only for purposes of adjudicating
claims against and to the extent of the fund.'5 While some cases
have discussed the hardship on non-resident claimants which could
result if the cross-claims against them were allowed, only a few courts
have based their decisions squarely on hardship rather than on the
lack of personal jurisdiction over the cross-claim defendant for any
controversy beyond that concerning the fund. 16 In cases where the
14. These categories are adopted from Chaffee, Broadening the Second Stage of
Federal Interpleader, 56 HARv. L. REv. 929 (1943).
15. Hagan v. Central Ave. Dairy, Inc., 180 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1950); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Enright, 231 F. Supp. 275 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Stitzel-Weller Distillery,
Inc. v. Norman, 39 F. Supp. 182 (W.D. Ky. 1941); Atlas Assurance Co. v. Needle,
Unreported: Civil Action No. 1240 (D. Md. 1941) (discussed in Chaffee, id. at
960-62).
16. Compare Coastal Airlines, Inc. v. Dockery, 180 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1950)
(cross-claim allowed as it would not work a hardship on cross-claim defendant);
Hallin v. C. A. Pearson, Inc., 34 F.R.D. 499 (N.D. Cal. 1963) (cross-claim disallowed
as it would work a hardship on cross-claim defendant); Bank of Neosho v. Colcord,
8 F.R.D. 621 (W.D. Mo. 1949) (cross-claim in rule 22(1) interpleader action against
nonresident upheld, on ground that appearance for purposes of interpleader action gives
a court general jurisdiction over subject matter and parties to cross-claim, provided
cross-claim and interpleader action arise out of same transaction), with Stitzel-Weller
Distillery, Inc. v. Norman, 39 F. Supp. 182 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (cross-claim against
non-resident in statutory interpleader action disallowed for lack of personal jurisdiction
over non-resident cross-claim defendant).
The Supreme Court recently commented on broadening interpleader actions to
include additional controversies in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S.
523 (1967). The case involved a collision between a Greyhound bus and a pickup
truck in California, resulting in injuries to bus passengers and to the driver and passenger of the pickup truck. The insurer of the pickup truck brought an action under
the Federal Interpleader Act in the District Court of Oregon, joining as defendants
all actual and potential claimants, including Greyhound, its driver, the bus passengers,
the pickup-truck driver and his passenger. Greyhound then sought the protection of
the interpleader statute by broadening the injunction in the Oregon interpleader action
to require the prosecution of all claims against it arising out of the collision to be
made in the interpleader action in Oregon. The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that
Greyhound was not entitled to the benefits of the interpleader statute, remarking in
dicta that interpleader "cannot be used to solve all the vexing problems of multiparty
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cross-claim defendant is a resident of the forum state none of these
jurisdictional problems are present, and the courts have shown more
willingness to allow the assertion of cross-claims, generally dismissing
them only if they have not arisen out of the same transaction as the
interpleader action, as required by rule 13(g). 17 In such cases, the
strictness with which the judge delimits the boundaries of the original
transaction can be crucial. 8
In the instant case the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
order allowing the assertion of the cross-claim by the administrator
against Queen City and the bus driver, claimants who were residents
of the forum state. As authority for this reversal the court quoted a
statement in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire,9 which said

that interpleader is not an all-purpose bill of peace, to be used to
solve all the difficult problems of multiparty litigation arising out of
a mass tort. Interpreting this to mean that an interpleader suit "may
not be used as the arena for resolution of claims of the defendants
inter se, except insofar as they have adversity in their demands upon
the fund,"20 the court concluded that a cross-claim under rule 13(g)
could be used by the administrator to attack the claims of the resident
cross-claim defendants against the common fund, but for no other
purpose. In a dissenting opinion,2 ' Chief Judge Haynsworth noted
the important differences between Tashire and the instant case and
litigation arising out of a mass tort." Id. at 535. This dicta was used by the majority
in the instant ease as authority for the disallowance of the administrator's cross-claim,
17. Kerrigan's Estate v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 199 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1952);
Degree of Honor Protective Ass'n v. Charles T. Bisch & Son, 194 F. Supp. 614 (D.
Mass. 1961); Lawyers Trust Co. v. W. G. Maguire & Co., 2 F.R.D. 310 (D. Del. 1942);
Stitzel-Weller Distillery, Inc. v. Norman, 39 F. Supp. 182 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (crossclaim by non-resident against resident dismissed but considered on its merits). But see
Consolidated Underwriters of S.C. Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw, 136 F. Supp. 395 (W.D.
Ark. 1955) (cross-claim by non-resident against resident in Rule 22(1) interpleader
action disallowed on ground that jurisdiction limited to distribution of fund). This
last case is strongly criticized as "clearly improper" in 3 J. Moonz, FEDERA PRAGmCE
22.15, at 3132 (2d ed. 1966).
2
18. See Professor Chaffees remarks on Lawyers Trust Co. v. W. G. Maguire & Co.,
2 F.R.D. 310 (D. Del. 1942), in Chaffee, Broadening the Second Stage of Federal
Interpleader, 56 HARv. L. REv. 929, 981-83 (1943), wherein he suggests that the
court was perhaps too strict in its view of the transaction.
19. 386 U.S. 523 (1967). The dicta cited in the opinion was as follows: "We
recognize, of course, that our view of interpleader means that it cannot be used to
solve all the vexing problems of multiparty litigation arising out of a mass tort. But
interpleader was never intended to perform such a function, to be an all-purpose bill of
peace.' . . . None of the legislative and academic sponsors of a modem federal interpleader device viewed their accomplishment as a 'bill of peace,' capable of sweeping
dozens of lawsuits out of the various state and federal courts in which they were
brought and into a single interpleader proceeding." 386 U.S. at 535-36. Cited in the
instant case at 382 F.2d at 87.
20. 382 F.2d at 87.
21. Id. at 88-89.
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concluded that the former did not provide authority for dismissing
the administrator's cross-claim. In Tashire, which involved a buspickup truck collision in California, it was the bus company, as crossclaim plaintiff, which sought to compel all adverse tort plaintiffsincluding injured bus passengers, the truck driver, and his passenger
-to proceed against it only in the Oregon interpleader action brought
by the insurer of the pickup truck22 In the instant case, the crossclaim plaintiff was the administartor of the deceased automobile passengers, who sought to cross-claim against the bus company and its
driver, both residents of the forurn state. The Chief Judge therefore
argued that the dismissal was improper, since the administrator's
cross-claim sought no broad, unfair objective, as did that of the bus
company in Tashire, and since deciding which claimant had a superior
claim to the insurance fund in the interpleader action necessarily involved litigating the same issues of negligence raised by the crossclaim.
In disallowing the cross-claim, the majority failed to analyze the
case, preferring to apply dicta from a Supreme Court case which was
not in point.P The resolution of whether cross-claims are assertible in
interpleader actions should not be an automatic dismissal of every
cross-claim. Rather, a discerning analysis of the particular case should
be made, with a balancing of the advantages and hardships resulting
from allowance of the cross-claim. 24 The majority failed to recognize
that the question of whether cross-claims are assertible in interpleader
actions involves a balancing of competing policies. On the one hand,
a policy of consolidation of litigation to prevent unnecessary multiplicity encourages courts to allow all cross-claims which arise out of
the same transaction as the interpleader suit. On the other hand, a
policy of ensuring fairness to all parties to the action encourages courts
to disallow cross-claims against non-resident, and occasionally resident,
cross-claim defendants. Since this balancing process is involved, the
allowance of cross-claims in interpleader is necessarily a matter for
judicial discretion25 In order properly to balance the competing
22. See note 19 supra.
23. Id.
24. "[T]he judge who is hearing the interpleader should balance the convenience
of a single trial against whatever hardship this will really cause the outside claimant,
and then cautiously admit the independent controversy in a few cases where the

speedy administration of justice will be clearly promoted without serious injury to
the objecting nonresident." Chaffee, Broadening the Second Stage of Federal Interpleader, 56 I-Rv.L. 11Ev. 929, 938 (1943).
25. "[I]n the second stage of an interpleader . . .joinder should be even easier ...

than in an independent action at law because of the equity tradition of doing nothing
by halves. The Chancellor has long sought to accomplish complete justice between
the parties before him. . . .It would be only a short step to use a somewhat similar
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policies two requirements should be satisfied before leave to file a
cross-claim in interpleader is granted: the rule 13(g) requirement
that the cross-claim arise out of the same transaction or occurrence
as the interpleader suit; and the requirement that the cross-claim
defendant not be unfairly subjected to the claim of a co-party merely
because he has come into court to assert his claim against the deposited fund. The rule 13(g) requirement should be administered
liberally in order to prevent unnecessary multiplicity of litigation.
In the instant case, the cross-claim clearly satisfies this requirement,
as the dissent indicates. The occurrence out of which both the interpleader action and the cross-claim arise was the collision between the
Queen City bus and the insured's automobile, and the issues of
negligence are common to both the interpleader action and the
cross-claim. The second requirement, fairness to the cross-claim defendant, becomes especially important when the cross-claim defendant
is a non-resident of the forum state.2 1 While many of the cases to
date have disallowed such cross-claims on grounds of lack of personal
jurisdiction over the non-resident cross-claim defendant, a better approach would be to hold that the court would have personal jurisdiction over him if it had personal jurisdiction for purposes of the interpleader action.27 In such an instance, the ground for dismissal is not
lack of personal jurisdiction; rather, it is the fact, as determined by
the court, that allowance of the cross-claim would work a hardship
on the cross-claim defendant, 2 such as deterring him from coming
into court to assert his claim against the deposited fund.2 The possibility of such hardship is rare when the cross-claim defendant is a
resident of the forum state. 30 In such cases, the cross-claim should
normally be allowed, provided it arises out of the same transaction
or occurrence as the interpleader action, and no other substantial
flexibility in the second stage of interpleader. This does not mean that the court
hearing the interpleader is forced to admit every additional controversy between the
claimants in the second stage. The judge can use his discretion as in ordinary cases
when joinder is sought. He can exclude inconvenient outside controversies. It is
really a question of multifariousness." Chaffee, Broadening the Second Stage of Interpleader, 56 HARv. L. Rnv. 541, 548 (1943).
26. See 3 J. MoonE, FEnDzAL PREcAcE ff 22.15, at 3132 (2d ed. 1966).
27. "[Clourts have sometimes been too quick to rely upon an assumed jurisdictional
defect as a ground for outright dismissal of the cross-claim. Id. at 3132.
28. Id. In a recent case involving an asserted cross-claim in a statutory interpleader
action, the court stated: "[A]llowance of an in personam cross-clahn by one claimant
against another should rest, not upon the point of appearance, but upon a cautious
application of Rule 13(g) in the light of the unique service of process feature of the
Federal Interpleader Act." Hain v. C. A. Pearson, Inc., 34 F.R.D. 499, 503 (N.D.
Cal. 1963).
29. Hagan v. Central Ave. Dairy, Inc., 180 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1950).
30. 3 MoonE, supra note 26.
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reason exists for disallowance. 31 It is this requirement of fairness
to the cross-claim defendant which is the basis for differentiating
between the instant case, in which such disallowance of the crossclaim was improper, and Tashire, in which such disallowance was
proper, since allowance of the cross-claim in Tashire would have given
the bus company an unfair advantage over other parties adverse to
it, as the Supreme Court recognized. 32

Torts-An Unemancipated Minor May Maintain
Action for Personal Injuries Caused by a
Parent's Negligent Driving
Plaintiff brought an action on behalf of his six year-old daughter
against her mother for personal injuries sustained as a result of the
mother's negligent driving. The defendant moved to dismiss on

grounds of parental immunity. Depositions made part of the motion
for summary judgment revealed that the mother had picked up her
daughter from a babysitter and that the two were proceeding home
when the accident occurred. The record also revealed the existence
of liability insurance. In a case of first impression, the trial court
denied the motion and allowed the action. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Alaska, held, affirmed. An unemancipated minor may maintain an action against a parent for personal injuries caused by the

parent's negligent driving. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967).
31. An objection by a cross-claim defendant that allowance of the cross-claim
would deprive him of a jury trial should seldom be sustained. Under modem procedure,
a jury trial is readily available, at the court's discretion, even in interpleader actions
where there is normally no right to a jury trial. See Chaffee, supra note 9, at 552-53,
555-57. In proper cases, such as those like the instant case involving multiple torts, a
jury would probably be used by the court to try the issues of negligence, thus affording
the cross-claim defendant his desired jury trial. Of course, a trial judge may disallow
a cross-claim on the ground that a jury trial would unnecessarily complicate the interpleader action, which is a valid exercise of judicial discretion. Also it should be noted
that the denial of a cross-claim between co-claimants in an interpleader action provides
an ideal framework for the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, should a
later suit be brought on the cause of action asserted in the disallowed cross-claim. If
the resolution of the interpleader action necessitates the determination of the relative
negligence of the parties to the disallowed cross-claim, then the unsuccessful crossclaimant could be deemed collaterally estopped from bringing suit on this cross-claim
in a subsequent action. See RESTATEmENT OF JuDGEmENTs § 68 (1942); Chaffee, supra
note 9, at 533. Of course, if the judgment in the interpleader suit was for the unsuccessful cross-claim plaintiff, then he could later bring suit for damages, the issue of
negligence having already been determined in his favor, and the cross-claim defendant
would be collaterally estopped from denying his liability.
32. 386 U.S. at 533-34.
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The weight of judicial authority denies an unemancipated minor
civil redress for personal injury caused by a parent.' Although early

common law cases permitted property and contract actions between
parent and child, the early English reports contain no personal injury

cases; however, most commentators agree there was no rule preventing

such an action. 2 The doctrine of parental immunity in the United

States was introduced by a Mississippi court in Hewlett v. George,3
where, without citing prior authority, the court dismissed an unemancipated child's false imprisonment action against her mother on
the grounds of "sound public policy" and "the peace of society."
Citing Hewlett, a Tennessee court in McKelvey v. McKelvey,4 dismissed a minor's action against her father and stepmother for cruel

and inhuman treatment. Similarly, in Roller v. Roller, a Washington
court held that a minor had no civil remedy against her father for

rape.5 These cases form the basis for the American doctrine of parental immunity, and although the rule has been criticized by writers, 6
only two jurisdictions have rejected it The principal reasons offered
1. Decisions upholding parental immunity on the specific issue of negligent driving
include: Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29 (Me. 1966); Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J.
247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 215
N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961); Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952);
Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966); Tucker v. Tucker,
395 P. 2d 67 (Okla. 1964); Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Ore. 374, 397 P.2d 771 (1964);
Castellucci v. Castellucci, 96 R.I. 34, 188 A.2d 467 (1963); Maxey v. Sauls, 242 S.C.
247, 130 S.E.2d 570 (1963); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
2. W. PnossEn, TORTs § 116, at 886 (3d ed. 1964); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons
in Domestic Relations, 43 HAnv. L. Rv. 1030, 1059-62 (1930). Sanford, Personal
Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. Rv. 823, 832 (1956), indicates that some
courts have reasoned that the absence of cases supports the proposition that no such
action was allowed, whereas others reason the absence shows there was no bar. In
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) the court stated that there was a
bar at common law; however, the Washington court later repudiated this statement
as "clearly erroneous." Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1959).
3. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
4. 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 665 (1903) (abuse of parental power does not give
child civil action), Sanford, supra note 2, at 833 states that "[t]he basis of the rule
is not that the parent is under no duty with respect to his child, but rather that the
child has no right to bring a civil action against his parent for redress of such injuries."
5. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
6. McCurdy, supra note 2; Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the
Family-Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, 20 Mo. L. Rv. 152 (1961). See also
the extensive list of commentators and decisions cited in Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J.
247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960) (Jacobs, J., dissenting, at 254-55, 151 A.2d at 151-52).
These sources suggest that family harmony is no more threatened by tort actions
than by property and contract actions, which are allowed. Furthermore, when the
parental conduct which injured the child is unrelated to parental discipline, it is
difficult to justify denying recovery for personal injury on the basis of protecting
family harmony.
7. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Coller v. White, 20 Wis,
2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963) abrogated the rule except "(1) [where the alleged
negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2) where
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in support of the rule barring a child's action against his parent for
personal injury have been the fear that to allow such an action would
disturb the peace and harmony of the family and impair parental
discipline and control. Although the plaintiff in Roller argued the
absurdity of disallowing redress for rape in the interest of domestic

tranquillity and parental respect, the court determined that "there is

no practical line of demarkation [sic] which can be drawn."8 Various
other reasons supporting the rule have included prevention of depleting family funds, avoidance of fraud and collusion, deference to
the legislature regarding any change, and the adequacy of criminal
remedy. 9 However, numerous exceptions have been developed to

avoid the harsh results ensuing from a strict application of the rule.10
Thus some courts have drawn a line of demarcation and allowed an

action for personal injury caused by intentional" or "grossly negligent"

conduct, 12 primarily on the theory that the parent has abandoned13

the parental relation and family harmony has already been destroyed.

A few courts have refused to apply the rule when the parent was not
acting in his capacity as a parent, but rather in his business or occupational capacity, 14 or where the relation was one of carrier-pasthe alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with
respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and
other care." Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
8. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 244, 79 P. 788, 789 (1005).
9. McCurdy, supra note 2, at 1072-77.
10. It has been established that an emancipated minor may sue and be sued by a
parent; although not entirely consistent with some explanations for the rule of parental
immunity, the reasoning seems to be that possibility of disruption of family harmony
is lessened in the case of an emancipated child. Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63
A.2d 586 (1948); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Lancaster
v. Lancaster, 213 Miss. 536, 57 So. 2d 302 (1952); Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745
(Mo. 1959); Glover v. Glover, 44 Tenn. App. 712, 319 S.W.2d 238 (1958). Partial
emancipation, however, is not enough. Perkins v. Robertson, 140 Cal. App. 2d 536,
295 P.2d 972 (1956); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170 (1953).
11. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (illegitimate daughter was
eyewitness to father's murder of her mother and father's subsequent suicide; issue of
whether eyewitness bad tort action determined separately); Brown v. Selby, 206 Tenn.
71, 332 S.W.2d 166 (1960) (in killing his divorced wife the father destroyed peace
of family; right of recovery for wrongful death of mother passed to the children).
12. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 III. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Cowgill v. Boock,
189 Ore. 282, 218 F.2d 445 (1950) (reckless driving while intoxicated was beyond
scope, of parental authority and violative of father's duty to son).
13. Thus, these courts, while adopting the rule of parental immunity developed
in Hewlett, McKelvey, and Roller, would decide these cases involving intentional and
malicious conduct differently.
14. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952) (daughter injured
by fire from gasoline pump); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 658, 251 P.2d 149, 157
(1952) ("For all practical purposes the relationship between the two at the time of
the accident was not parent and child, but driver and pedestrian. The cost of operating
the business, if recovery is permitted here, will be no greater than it would have
been had a neighbor boy been the victim.").
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senger 5 or master-servant. 16 Basic to these exceptions is the fact
that the parent-child relationship is merely incidental. The extreme
to which some courts have gone in refusing specifically to reject the
rule, yet still allowing recovery, is indicated by cases holding that

immunity does not extend to an adoptive father,17 nor to a stepfather

who voluntarily stands in loco parentis. 18 Authorities have also held

that the parental immunity rule does not bar an action by an un-

emancipated minor against the estate of a deceased parent.19 Finally,
the existence of liability insurance has persuaded other courts to allow
child-parent recovery on the ground that there is little possibility of

disruption of family harmony, and that since the insurer will bear
the financial burden, the parent-child interests unite in favor of
recovery °
Rejecting application of the doctrine of parental immunity in the
instant case, the court reasoned that to deny an action for fear of
diminishing the family funds at the expense of other members of the

15. Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939) (minor daughter injured
by negligence of driver-employee while travelling on bus line operated by her father).
16. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352 150 A. 905 (1930) (while working at a regular
wage for father, son was injured through negligence of father; father carried employer's
liability on son). This jurisdiction rejected the parental immunity rule in 1966. Supra
note 7.
17. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939) (action by administrator
of adopted son's estate against adoptive father accused of administering strychnine
poison to son; although the action could easily have been allowed on the basis of
malicious wrong, the court went out of its way to hold specifically "that an adopted
child may sue an adoptive father for torts committed upon it (sic] which cause him
suffering and pain. Id. at 421, 129 S.W.2d at 248).
18. Burdick v. Nawrocki, 21 Conn. Supp. 272, 154 A.2d 242 (Super. Ct. 1959).
Although the court conceded the defendant's argument that the public policy of maintaining family harmony could not discriminate between stepfather and blood father,
it held that because the stepfather voluntarily assumed his responsibility and was
under no legal obligation of care and control of the child, parental immunity did not
extend to him.
19. Davis v. Smith, 253 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1958); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135
A.2d 65 (1957) (with death comes severance of family relationship).
20. Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939) (compulsory public liability
required by state statute to protect passengers on common carrier); Lusk v. Lusk, 113
W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932) ("business capacity" exception rejected, but action
allowed because parent protected by insurance in his vocational capacity as school bus
driver and his interest and injured daughter's both favored recovery). See also Dunlap
v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930). In this case, the father transferred final
financial liability by carrying employer's liability insurance. "Such immunity as the
parent may have from suit by the minor child for personal tort, arises from the
disability to sue, and not from lack of violated duty. This disability is not absolute.
It is imposed for the protection of the family control and harmony, and exists only
where a suit, or the prospect of a suit, might disturb the family relations. Stated from
the viewpoint of the parent, it is a privilege, but only a qualified one. . . .It does
not apply to an emancipated child, or to a case where the liability in fact has been
transferred to a third party." Id. at 372, 150 A. at 915. Contra, Luster v. Luster,
299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W.
1 (1932).
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family was an insufficient justification for the doctrine, since this
argument ignored the injury to the child's assets of health and
strength. The court reasoned that the fact that most parents have
liability insurance undermined the arguments regarding disruption of
family harmony and parental discipline, and that if a family does
not have insurance, the possibility of a suit on behalf of the child
is remote. Although the court recognized the danger of fraud and
collusion, it relied upon a dissenting opinion by Judge Fuld2 ' of the
New York Court of Appeals, and noted that the fraud-collusionperjury possibility exists in all liability insurance cases. That this
possibility is more prominent in parent-child relations merely demands
greater caution on the part of court and jury in assessing the facts,
rather than the total denial of redress to the injured child. The
court did not define the scope of its rejection of the parental immunity rule, but limited its decision to the given situation involving
negligent driving.
While society has an interest in providing a right to compensation
to persons injured by another's negligent or intentional acts, it also
has an interest in preserving the basic family unit from fear of liability
for personal injury resulting from the intimacy of daily living.22 Where
these policies conflict, the scales are clearly weighed in favor of
allowing redress for injuries resulting from intentional acts; however, in cases involving negligence, the scales are more evenly balanced. The instant court implies that the injured child should be
allowed redress where "it is reasonably clear that the domestic peace
has already been disturbed beyond repair or where by reason of the
circumstances it is not imperiled, and where the reasonableness of
family discipline is not involved."23 This approach would allow an
action in cases where liability insurance coverage exists, therefore
enabling the use of fraud and collusion as affirmative defenses. The
major argument against maintaining parental immunity thus becomes
the danger of fraud and collusion. The instant court wisely refused
to deny summarily an action to an entire class merely because of the
possibility of fraud or collusion. Clearly, there are many instances
in which no fraud is involved, and those injured should have a
day in court. If deemed necessary, legislatures could ensure this
21. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1981).
22. Sanford, supra note 2, at 840: "[Bly reason of the shortcomings of all humans,
the home is of necessity a somewhat dangerous place for its inhabitants. Children will
leave their roller skates on the front porch, and fathers will forget to fix the broken
stairs. Moreover, the lack of knowledge or of means may also create unsafe conditions
in the home. The nature of family life, therefore, compels the members of the family
group to accept the risks inherent in such circumstances."
23. 1 F. HAPa & F. JAMEs, ToRTs § 8.11 at 650 (1956), cited in, Hebel v. Hebel,
435 P.2d 8, 13 (Alas. 1967).
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right, although of course the gain to the public would no doubt be
minimal, since insurers would immediately amend policies to deny
intrafamily indemnity, or raise premium costs commensurate with
the added risk. Even with such a reaction from the insurance industry, however, injury could be redressed far more effectively than
is possible under a strict parental immunity rule. Such an abrogation
of the rule, legislative or judicial, is not only necessary if the courts
are to perform their function evenhandedly, but also required by
common sense, in that the hazards of modem living, traffic, and travel21 expose the child to greater risks than were present when the
parental immunity doctrine and its rationale were developed.

Trade Regulation-Dealer Coerced to Terminate
Franchise May Recover Future Profits Under
Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act
Plaintiff automobile dealer brought an action against defendant
manufacturer under The Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act,'
asserting that defendant had in bad faith and by coercion and intimidation forced plaintiff to terminate his dealership. As evidence of
bad faith, plaintiff alleged that defendant had refused to accept an
order for vehicles unless unwanted models were also ordered,2 and
that on numerous occasions defendant had refused to authorize certain warranty work for plaintiff, causing his customers to obtain service from other dealers. Plaintiff alleged further that he had not been
fully reimbursed for other warranty work which he had performed
under oral agreements with defendant's agents.3 The jury returned
24. Sanford, supra note 2, at 845-46.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964).
2. After pressure by manufacturer, dealer signed a "projection," in which he estimated a need for three American automobiles. Relying on the projection, manufacturer
produced the models. Defendant refused to accept an order for models that plaintiff
wanted until he also ordered one of the automobiles anticipated in the projection.
3. Manufacturer asserted that under its warranty agreement with plaintiff, it warranted cars to the dealer only; the dealer made warranties to purchasers and had the
obligation to do any warranty work on the cars. Only then could the dealer seek
reimbursement from the manufacturer. Dealer also asserted bad faith in manufacturer's
refusal to approve an assignment of dealer's franchise to a Chrysler dealer. Although
manufacturer's denial of bad faith alleged that its national policy was to avoid dual
dealerships in sales areas of similar potential, it subsequently did make an offer for
such a dealership arrangement in this same area. The court held that this refusal was
not pertinent to the decision of the case since it occurred after dealer had decided to
terminate.
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a verdict for plaintiff, 4 and manufacturer appealed, alleging that it had
acted in good faith and contending that the Act did not apply where
the dealer, rather than the manufacturer, terminated the franchise.
On appeal to United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
held, affirmed. Refusal by an automobile manufacturer to accept
orders from a dealer unless unwanted models are also accepted, and
refusal to authorize and to reimburse dealer for appropriate warranty
work constitute a "lack of good faith" which, when forcing the dealer to terminate his franchise, allows the dealer recovery under the
Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act. American Motors Sales Corp.
v. Semke, 384 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1967).
The franchise relationship between automobile dealer and manufacturer caused extensive litigation under the common law of contracts, the usual result being to deny the dealer a remedy on the
franchise agreement alone. 5 Not only were the dealer's rights under
the agreement difficult to enforce, but his bargaining position was
weak relative to that of the large automobile manufacturer. 6 In order
to balance the relationship so heavily weighted in favor of the manufacturer, Congress in 1956, enacted The Automobile Dealer's Day in
Court Act, which "create [d] a cause of action where none previously
existed in that, irrespective of contractual provisions, it grant[ed] a
right of review in the federal courts .... ."7 The dealer was given two
grounds for recovery: (1) lack of good faith by the manufacturer in
performing under the provisions of the franchise; and (2) lack of good
faith by the manufacturer in terminating, cancelling or failing to renew the franchise." The source of most litigation has been the scope
4. Judgment was rendered in the amount of $18,000 for loss of future profits as a
result of the termination of the franchise. On appeal, manufacturer argued that under
general contract law, the awarding of future profits was error.
5. Successful defenses of the manufacturer included: (1) the franchise lacked
mutuality of obligation and was therefore not a legal contract; (2) the franchise
provided for dealer's performance to the satisfaction of manufacturer, and therefore,
only the manufacturer could determine whether dealer had performed; (3) no
damages are recoverable, since loss of future profits was not contemplated by the
parties at the time the franchise agreement was signed; (4) the franchise was unenforceable because of indefiniteness, uncertainty, and lack of consideration; (5) the
manufacturer bad the right to terminate the contract at will, even if it was valid. S.
REP. No. 1879, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1956).
6. In 1954, 3 manufacturers accounted for 96% of the automobiles produced in the
United States, while there were 40,000 dealers. U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4597
(1956).
7. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4596 (1956).
8. The Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act provides in pertinent part: "An
automobile dealer may bring suit against any automobile manufacturer engaged in
commerce, in any district court of the United States . . . and shall recover the
damages by him sustained and the cost of suit by reason of the failure of said automobile manufacturer . . . to act in good faith in performing or complying with any
of the terms or provisions of the franchise, or in terminating, cancelling, or not re-
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of the good faith requirement. Although the Act and its legislative
history 9 impose upon each party the duty to act in good faith, neither
clearly indicates the scope of that duty. One view holds that only
that part of the dealer-manufacturer relationship governed by the
written franchise itself is within the scope of duty-not their entire
relationship. 10 This position would seem to imply that the manufacturer may insert in the contract any provision he desires, and acts
in bad faith only if he attempts to exercise powers that he does not
clearly have. A contrary view of the scope of the good faith duty
is that it actually modifies even express terms of the contract so that
the manufacturer cannot use its contractual powers to force the
dealer's economic demise." This latter view would make manufacturer's lack of good faith actionable when "it relates to" compliance
with provisions of the franchise, or termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of the franchise.'2 In addition to determining the scope of
the good faith requirement, there is the related question of what
constitutes a lack of good faith. From the Act's definition of good
faith, it is clear that a "lack of good faith" must be determined within
the context of coercion, intimidation or threats thereof.13 The Act,
therefore, does not protect the dealer from the manufacturer's unfair,
inequitable, or arbitrary behavior which is noncoercive. 14 Thus far,
no case interpreting the good faith requirement and resulting in a
verdict against the manufacturer has been upheld on appeal.'9 Case
newing the franchise with said dealer: Provided, That in any such suit the manufacturer shall not be barred from asserting in defense of any such action the failure
of the dealer to act in good faith." 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1964).
9. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 4596 (1956).
10. Note, Statutory Regulation of Manufacturer-DealerRelationships in the Automobile Industry, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1239, 1246-47 (1957). Support for this position
can be found in General Motors Corp. v. MAC Co., 247 F. Supp. 723 (D.C. Colo.
1965). See Note, The Automobile Dealer Franchise Act of 1956-An Evaluation,
48 CoPNELL L.Q. 711, 726 (1963).
11. Southern Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 375 F.2d 932 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967).
12. "Manufacturer coercion or intimidation or threats thereof is actionable by the
dealer where it relates to performing or complying with any of the terms or provisions of the franchise, or where it relates to the termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of the dealer's franchise. Thus, where a dealer's resistance to manufacturer
pressure is related to cancellation or non-renewal of his franchise a cause of action
would arise." U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 4603 (1956).
13. Good faith is defined as "the duty of each party . . . to act in a fair and
ethical manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one party freedom from
coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation from the other party. ..
15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1964).
14. Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 1173, 1182 (1966); Note, The Automobile Dealers Act, 9
STAN. L. Rnv. 760, 769 (1957). For example, cancellation of a franchise without
cause must be proved to be part of a pattern of coercive behavior before an action
is possible.
15. Two cases rendering verdicts for the dealer were reversed on appeal. Globe
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law thus emphasizes the negative, illustrating what does not constitute a lack of good faith, rather than establishing standards for determining whether the good faith requirement has been met. Where
the manufacturer terminates or refuses to renew the franchise because of the dealer's failure to perform his obligations under the contract, the courts have found the termination to be in good faith. 6
Similarly, absent coercion or intimidation, it is not a lack of good
faith for a manufacturer to take action which, though not authorized
by the agreement, is not expressly prohibited by its terms, such as
establishing a competing dealership or discriminating in the allocation
of fast-selling models.' 7 Nor is it a lack of good faith for a manufacturer to refuse to perform an act which it is not obligated by the
franchise to perform, such as approving assignment of a franchise
when the manufacturer honestly doubts the ability and financial resources of the applicant. 8 The legislative history of the Act must be
consulted for an affirmative example of the circumstances from which
the existence of coercion or intimidation may be inferred: "[M]anufacturer pressure... upon a dealer to accept automobiles ... which
the dealer does not need, want, or feel the market is able to absorb,
may in appropriate instances constitute coercion or intimidation." 9
Facts similar to this example were present in Kotula v. Ford Motor
Co.,20 where the dealer alleged that he was unable to obtain needed
models unless he also accepted an unwanted model. The court held
this was not an "appropriate instance" for finding the manufacturer's
termination coercive, since the termination was caused by the dealer's
Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645 (3rd Cir. 1964); Garvin v.

American Motors Sales Corp., 318 F.2d 518 (3rd Cir. 1963).
16. Such breaches of contract by the dealer that have been held to permit good
faith manufacturer termination include: (1) Failure to meet reasonable sales quotas
as provided in the francise. Leach v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F. Supp. 349 (N.D.
Cal. 1960); Sam Goldfarb Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 214 F. Supp. 600 (E.D.
Mich. 1962). (2) Failure to maintain adequate facilities as required by the contract,
Milos v. Ford Motor Co., 317 F.2d 712 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963);
Woodard v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
887 (1962). (3) Failure to provide the manufacturer with adequate representation,
Staten Island Motors, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 169 F. Supp. 378 (D.N.J.
1959). (4) Failure to maintain sufficient working capital and employees or to submit
required financial statements specified in the franchise, Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645 (3rd Cir. 1964); Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 241
F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Tenn. 1965); Augusta Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors
Sales Corp., 213 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Ga. 1963).
17. Southern Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 375 F.2d 932 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967); Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp.,
318 F.2d 518 (3rd Cir. 1963).
18. Pierce Ford Sales Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 299 F.2d 425 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 829 (1962).
19. U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4603 (1956).
20. 338 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 979 (1965).
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failure to comply with the franchise provisions, rather than by its
forced acceptance of the unwanted model. After a dealer has proved
that the questioned conduct evidenced a lack of good faith under
the Act, he must further establish a relationship between the manufacturer's bad faith and the performance or termination of the franchise agreement. With one exception the cases concerning the lack
of good faith in termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal specify the
manufacturer as the one who ended the dealership. In that case,
Pinney & Topliff v. Chrysler Corporation,21 the court assumed, with-

out deciding, that a dealer forced to terminate on his own behalf as
the result of coercion by the manufacturer would have a cause of
action. However, since the court found that the dealer terminated
voluntarily and without coercion, the question whether a terminating
dealer could recover under the Act was left unresolved.
In deciding, as a case of first impression, whether the Automobile
Dealer's Day in Court Act is applicable where the dealer terminates
as a result of the manufacturer's coercion, the court in the instant
case resorted to the legislative history2 of the Act. Where the coercion
or intimidation compelled the dealer to terminate, the court held that
"it relates to" the termination as required by the statute, interpreted
in light of its legislative history. The Kotulki case was distinguished
on the ground that there the dealer had not adequately fulfilled his
franchise obligations, while the issue in the instant case was whether
the manufacturer had coerced the dealer into terminating, not whether
the manufacturer was justified in terminating.2 4 Considering whether
the manufacturer had acted in bad faith, the instant court held that
the facts established were sufficient for the jury to find that pressure
was applied, causing the plaintiff to take unwanted cars, amounting
to coercive or intimidative acts within the statute as explained by its
legislative history.25
The Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act is designed to equalize
the bargaining positions of the dealers and the manufacturers. The
Tenth Circuit's holding would seem to misconstrue this objective.
The Act gives the dealer causes of action for the manufacturer's
21. 176 F. Supp. 801 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
22. See note 12 supra for the wording of the pertinent section of the legislativo
history.
23. 338 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 979 (1965).
24. Relying on the reasoning of the district court in Garvin v. American Motors
Sales Corp., 202 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 318 F.2d
518 (3rd Cir. 1963), the court upheld the lower court's allowance of damages for
loss of future profits.
25. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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failure to act in good faith: (1) in performing or complying with
the franchise provisions; or (2) in terminating, cancelling, or not
renewing the franchise. Where a dealer is coerced in the performance
of the contract, he has a right to damages under the first cause of
action. The instant case holds, however, that a dealer need not prevent a manufacturer's coercion in performance, but may instead delay,
terminate on his own, and recover under the second cause of action
pertaining to termination. Such a decision creates the possibility of
injustice to the manufacturer. After even an isolated act with the
appearance of coercion, a dealer may, without actual necessity, terminate the franchise and sue the manufacturer for damages before a
jury, which is likely to be more receptive to the small dealer than
the large automobile manufacturer.2 The uncertain boundaries of
lack of good faith" give the jury considerable freedom in judging
the acts of the manufacturer. Although the Act gives the manufacturer the defense of the dealer's lack of good faith,2 it could be
a difficult task to prove that the dealer coerced or intimidated the
manufacturer. The dealer's first cause of action under the Act gives
him the power to prevent manufacturer's pressure from becoming so
great as to cause him to terminate.2 However, by allowing the dealer
to ignore the first cause of action, terminate, and sue under the
second, the court appears to have diverged from the literal wording
of the statute which awards damages under the second cause of action
for "failure of the . . . manufacturer . to act in good faith . . in
terminating.. , the franchise... ."29 The only justification given for
this departure is one sentence of a two-sentence paragraph in the legislative history3° to the effect that coercion or intimidation is actionable
if "it relates to" termination. However, the second sentence goes on
to illustrate the first, indicating that if the manufacturer applies coercion, the dealer resists, and the manufacturer consequently brings
the franchise to an end, then the dealer has a cause of action. 31 This
interpretation is based upon the belief that Congress, in creating a
26. Dealers' attorneys who have tried cases under the Act admit that juries tend
to be sympathetic toward the dealer. This fact enables settlement of many cases
with manufacturer without a trial. See S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER;
ThrE AuTomoBImE MA uAcTunERs AND THEm DF-Ls
97, 206 (1966). The instant
decision gives dealer the right to terminate and the power to threaten a jury trial in
his attempts to reach an out-of-court settlement with the manufacturer.
27. See note 8 supra.
28. The dealer could get an injunction for the interval between filing of the suit
and final adjudication if it appeared that otherwise the manufacturer's coercive or
intimidative acts would force the dealer to terminate during the interim.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1964).
30. 384 F.2d at 197.
31. See note 12 supra for the wording of both sentences from the legislative history.
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cause of action for termination, would not duplicate the cause of
action for lack of good faith in performing, which is contained in the
same brief section of the Act. Thus, while giving the first indication
of what constitutes a lack of good faith under the Act, the court had
little justification upon which to base its departure from the literal
wording of the statute and to give the dealer the right to terminate
and sue for loss of future profits.

